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Introduction 
 
Much has been said and written in recent years about the need to develop effective border policies 
that integrate trade and security.  Though the problem of expediting cross border commerce and 
travel pre-dates 9/11, it has taken on a new urgency because of concerns that a more robust North 
American security paradigm increases the costs of trade and therefore imperils North American 
competitiveness.  These concerns have become especially prominent in the aftermath of the 2008 
recession. 
  
Pronouncements and official documents from both Canadian and US federal governments make it 
clear that facilitating trade is a core commitment in the development and implementation of border 
policy.  An important challenge is translating that commitment into workable ideas and effective 
policy actions.  
  
It is this challenge that prompted the Border Policy Research Institute (BPRI) at Western 
Washington University to assemble a group of prominent scholars to make practical 
recommendations for facilitating the flow of goods and people while ensuring border security.  In 
contrast to typical academic conferences, the idea was to forgo the usual formal trappings of keynote 
speakers and luncheons and focus on “rubber meets the road” policy suggestions that could be 
implemented quickly and without changes in law or formal regulations.  We also wanted to convene 
a seminar that would be a two-way dialogue between academics and agency officials.  In our view, 
there is considerable value in policy practitioners learning from academics, but also in academics 
learning from practitioners.  This kind of dialogue is important in making effective operational 
policy and in helping steer the course of future academic research.  The seminar we envisaged would 
be built around highly focused, short papers that would be circulated to key agency officials in DHS, 
State, Transportation and other relevant agencies well before the seminar date.  Our goal was to 
enlist agency officials as well as academics as discussants for the papers.  Following the seminar, 
revised papers and discussion commentaries would be published as proceedings and made available 
on the BPRI website.   
 
The seminar was divided into three panels.  The first panel contained three papers focused on 
changes in freight processes at and near the border that could increase efficiency for trucks.  The 
three papers in the second panel suggested specific organizational changes in governance at the port 
level and in the Department of Homeland Security that could improve trade facilitation.  The final 
panel focused on reducing the transaction costs of cross border business by simplifying compliance 
with NAFTA rules of origin.   
 
This seminar was tailored to meet the needs of policy officials based in Washington, D.C.  Future 
seminars of this kind could be held in Ottawa and state and provincial capitals in recognition that 
the Canada-US border is highly diverse with different regions sharing many commonalities but also 
facing significant differences. 
 
Don Alper, Director, Border Policy Research Institute 
May 11, 2010 
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Photo 1. WWU 
students record 
commercial 
vehicle booth-
arrival and 
departure times as 
well as vehicle 
classification at 
one of several 
observation 
locations along 
the border 
approach at 
Pacific Highway. 
Looking for Efficiency Gains at the Pacific Highway Commercial Border Crossing 
Hugh Conroy 
Abstract 
Using time stamped event logs of commercial vehicle border-arrival, processing, and departure 
patterns at the Pacific Highway border crossing, this paper presents analyses that identify two 
potential strategies for increasing efficiency of the port-of-entry.  The analysis also illustrates a best 
practice in binational and government-academia collaboration. 
Introduction 
This paper summarizes select analyses of commercial-vehicle operations (CVO) data collected 
during the 2009 IMTC CVO Survey1. While the survey covered all three commercial ports-of-entry 
(POEs) in the Cascade Gateway both entering the U.S. and entering Canada, this paper focuses on 
U.S. inbound commercial traffic at the Pacific Highway, the primary commercial land-border 
crossing serving the U.S. Interstate 5 and BC Highway 99 trade lane.  
At Pacific Highway, surveyors observed operations on four separate weekdays in each direction 
collecting data on over 3,000 commercial trips. Data include arrival time at queue-end, arrival time at 
the primary inspection booth, departure time from the primary booth, vehicle-type, 
commodity/empty, inspection-lane type (FAST or standard), carrier name & base city, trip origin, 
and trip destination. While these data can be used to examine countless aspects of CVO, this paper 
focuses on two facets of operations at Pacific Highway which may offer opportunities for increasing 
system efficiency. 
More broadly, the collection and application of these data represent the successful collaboration of 
U.S. and Canadian inspection agencies; federal, state and provincial transportation agencies; academia; 
and many others working through the International Mobility and Trade Corridor Project (IMTC). 
                                                 
1
 The International Mobility & Trade Corridor Project (IMTC) Commercial Vehicle Operations Survey: A project of the 
IMTC funded by WWU-BPRI and conducted by BPRI & the Whatcom Council of Governments in partnership with 
CBP and CBSA. 
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A
Truck A inspection ends, proceeds.
Truck B transition time
begins.BC
Truck B sees it can proceed and does.
BC
Truck B arrives at primary. Transition
time ends.
Inspection time
begins. BC
Booth 2 Booth 3 Booth 2 Booth 3
Mean 00:25.0 00:29.6 00:27.1 00:27.6
Median 00:22.0 00:27.0 00:23.0 00:24.0
Mode 00:19.0 00:27.0 00:21.0 00:19.0
Standard Deviation 00:16.8 00:17.8 00:16.2 00:16.9
Minimum 00:04.0 00:03.0 00:04.0 00:04.0
Maximum 01:56.0 02:00.0 01:59.0 01:59.0
Count 591 485 733 619
Southbound (CBP) Northbound (CBSA)Summary Statistics
1. Transition time is important 
The key determinants of lineups and wait-times at an inspection booth are arrival rate and service 
rate. Service rate is typically associated with the time it takes to inspect a truck—average inspection 
time. While inspection time is typically the bulk of “service-time” allocable to each truck, a truck-
specific, primary inspection service time is the total time between a truck’s arrival at primary 
inspection and the next truck’s arrival at that primary booth. CBP has made ongoing efforts to speed 
inspection time such as the ACE environment and e-manifest specifically. The remaining portion of 
a truck’s service time gets less attention. I am calling this portion transition time-- the time between 
a truck booth departure and the next truck’s booth arrival.  Unlike a truck’s incremental movements 
through the queue, the time associated with this final segment of the approach is a significant 
component of the service rate.  
Using the CVO data, transition times were calculated by subtracting the time values of trucks’ 
booth-departures from the booth-arrival time of the next truck.  This calculation is specific to each 
booth for all the hours the survey was underway. 
Summarized observations of U.S.-bound commercial vehicles at Pacific Highway indicate that the 
average transition time is about 25 seconds which, on average, comprises between 20 and 25 percent 
of per-truck service time. 
Observation 1-1. Transition times are a large share of service time. 
Table 1. Summary statistics on transition times observed at the 
non-FAST CBP booths and the non-FAST CBSA booths. 
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration 
of transition time. 
Yellow arch 
indicates relative 
location of radiation 
portal monitors. 
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Transition time variability 
A frequency distribution of transition times for the full survey period at the U.S. POE at Pacific 
Highway is shown above.  Most of the times are distributed within a range between 10 and 40 
seconds. But, there are many much longer transition times. 
Looking more closely at transition times, Figure 3 is a time series illustrating that 1) long transition 
times are much longer than the average, and 2) they seem, in this sample chart, to be periodic. 
Observation 1-2: Queuing theory holds that line-ups generally worsen the higher the variability of 
either arrival rate or service rate. Given the periodic occurrence of long transition times, the benefits 
of actions to reduce them should be assessed with a more precise micro simulation. 
 
Figure 2. Sample 
frequency 
distribution of 
commercial 
vehicle transition 
times at Pacific 
Highway port-of-
entry. 
Figure 3.  A 
sequence of 
transitions 
times at 
southbound 
Pacific 
Highway. 
SB PH Booth 2
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Observation 1-3: Experience in the field during the survey sheds some light on likely causes of long 
transition times. Many of the long transitions occur on the hour when inspectors’ shifts change. 
Computer log-off and log-on as well as cash-register reconciliations require a pause in vehicle 
processing. 
Observation 1-4. Since radiation portal monitors (RPMs) were installed by CBP, it has been 
assumed by many that the associated requirement that trucks wait behind the RPMs until the booth 
clears (about a 100-foot or 2 truck-length setback) added a significant number of seconds to 
transition-time. However, preliminary comparisons of truck booth transition times between the CBP 
and CBSA (CBSA does not have RPMs) show very similar summary-statistics. RPMs don’t appear to 
be a meaningful factor. This finding warrants a detailed follow up on the dynamics of final booth 
approach at CBSA. 
2. Imports in cars 
When commercial goods are driven across the border in a personal vehicle or a pickup truck (or 
when the car is the import), they must use the same commercial inspection lanes and booths as the 
large trucks carrying much larger quantities of goods. This section examines the inspection times and 
commodities associated with these vehicles in order to evaluate whether operational alternatives 
might be worth considering. 
Inspection times 
As shown in the table below, passenger cars and pickup trucks have the highest average inspection 
time of the vehicle types observed during the 2009 CVO survey. 
Observation 2-1. While passenger vehicles and pickup trucks comprised eight percent of all vehicles 
using the commercial lanes they account for eleven percent of the cumulative inspection time (as 
observed during the survey period). These are the only vehicle types whose percentage of the vehicle 
population is less than their share of associated inspection time. 
Passenger vehicles’ average inspection time (157 seconds) is 36 seconds higher than the average 
inspection time for tractor vans (121 seconds)—a 30 percent difference and a 38 percent increase 
over the overall average inspection time of 114 seconds. 
 
Table 2. Average 
inspection times 
by vehicle type 
with distribution 
of vehicle type 
and relative 
share of total 
inspection time. 
Southbound 
Pacific Highway 
Standard lanes 
only. Does not 
include FAST 
VehicleType
Count of 
Vehicle 
Type
Percent of 
vehicles
Average 
Inspection 
Time 
(Sec.)
Total 
Inspection 
Time During 
Survey (Sec.)
Percent of 
time
PassengerVehicle 61 5% 157 9,583 7%
PickupTruck 34 3% 155 5,281 4%
Other 18 2% 140 2,522 2%
TractorVan 696 59% 121 84,217 60%
LightTruck 106 9% 117 12,394 9%
TractorOther 19 2% 108 2,043 1%
TruckTrailer 12 1% 102 1,224 1%
TractorContainer 43 4% 99 4,252 3%
Truck 4 0% 97 388 0%
TractorFlatbed 137 12% 93 12,786 9%
TractorTank 40 3% 89 3,558 3%
TractorOnly 14 1% 85 1,187 1%
1,184 100% 139,435 100%
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Table 3. 
Commodities carried 
by passenger vehicles 
and pickup trucks. 
Standard lanes 
only. Does not 
include FAST 
MUSICAL DRUMS SOAP CONTACT LENSES
WATER SAVER KITS FLOWERS BOOKS
WOOD CARVINGS AND JEWELRY MAGAZINES AND BROCHURES CIRCUIT BOARDS
EMPTY [PICKING UP HOT SAUCE] ART WORK, OWNER OF CARS HAIR PRODUCTS
MODEL TOY TRAINS BUTTERFLY EGGS CIRCUIT BOARDS
HUMAN SKULLS HEADLIGHTS PRINTED MATERIAL
MAIL LEMONADE EMPTY
DENTAL APPLIANCES BREAD, GROCERIES CABINET PARTS
BOOKS CHOCOLATE POKER CHIPS
BOOKS EMPTY HAIR CARE PRODUCTS
EMPTY CAGES EMPTY MOLDINGS FOR CABINETS
WHEELCHAIRS AUTO PARTS EMPTY
BREAD GARDEN SCULPTURES MARINE ACCESSORIES
GOLF BALL LAUNCH MONITOR MOTORCYCLE PARTS CAR
BOOKS MAIL TO AMS HUMAN SPECIMENS
EMPTY LAPTOP BATTERIES PHARMACEUTICALS
WIRE LEAF STRAINERS WAFFLE CONES MOTORCYCLE PARTS
DENTAL IMPRESSIONS VINYL STICKERS BONSAI PLANTS, LIVE
TOOLS
KAYAKS AND PARTS
MAINTNENCE VEHICLE ENGINE PARTS SNAKE GRASS
TRANSPORTING PICKUP TRUCK GALLERY SUPPLIES, MAILERS EMPTY
EMPTY EMPTY EMPTY
CONTROL PANEL EMPTY EMPTY
SCAFFOLD DECKS ALUMINUM RAILING EMPTY
EMPTY TRUCK HIDES
CAR PART EMPTY IMPORTING TRUCK
EMPTY WIRE EMPTY
CONSTRUCTION TRASH IMPORTING TRUCK
COMPUTER EQUIPMENT IMPORTING TRUCK
FLOORING IMPORTING TRUCK
PacificHighway Southbound Passenger Vehicle & Pickup Trucks -- Commodities
SERVICE TEAM DOING WORK IN CANADA--NO COMMODITIES
Passenger Vehicles
Pickup Trucks
Car borne commodities at Pacific Highway 
The table below lists the commodity description given by the cars or pickup truck that entered the 
U.S. at Pacific Highway during the June 2009 survey. While the survey did not collect any 
information on shipment value or on the type of customs entry (formal or informal), a review of the 
table below would seem to indicate a preponderance of low value shipments.  
Observation  2-2: Given that cars and pickup trucks consistently take more time to complete a 
primary inspection and given that the typical commodity is low value and likely an informal entry, 
should CBP (and CBSA ) evaluate alternatives that would process these vehicles differently? Any 
alternative would seem to indicate primary arrival at the passenger booths. A proposal for how 
import entry and inspection could proceed from this point is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Conclusions 
The preceding data-based observations are intended to illustrate the merits of giving further 
consideration to operational alternatives that would: 
1. Diminish periodic spikes in transition time and lower transition times in general. 
2. Redirect passenger-vehicles engaged in trade from the predominantly large-truck arrival 
stream at the commercial inspection lanes. 
Details of possible alternative procedures are managed by the inspection agencies and are beyond 
the scope of this paper. But, if alternatives were generally considered to be available, this paper gives 
two examples of scenarios that merit a more detailed benefit-cost analysis of adopting changes. 
Range of applicability 
The types of data gathered in the 2009 IMTC CVO Survey allow system managers to evaluate 
operations in greater detail and identify and rationalize changes that may appear small but have 
meaningful effect—fine tuning. The way in which improved insight into freight-flow characteristics 
can improve efforts to optimize border operations will be different over time and geography. As we 
see now, traffic volumes change. Vehicle-type mix and commodity mix change. The configurations 
of approach roads and associated hardware change. These realities, while fairly obvious, lead to two 
closing points. 
1) Conclusions reached above are based on data and observations collected at one region’s 
ports-of-entry and are not intended as ideas for standardized border policy. 
2) Periodic collection of detailed operational data and evaluation of resulting information 
with institutional partners is a valuable component of ongoing system management. 
 
Acknowledgments 
The following people and institutions have done a lot of good work and offered help and advice that 
makes this kind of investigation possible. US CBP, Blaine; CBSA Pacific Region; David Davidson, 
WWU Border Policy Research Institute; Melissa Miller, Whatcom Council of Governments; Mark 
Springer, WWU Decision Sciences; Chris Hoff, Transport Canada, and many others. Thank you
    7 
Strategies for Increasing the Use of the FAST Program at Canada-US Border 
Crossings 
William P.  Anderson 
Abstract 
The Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program allows prequalified shipments to cross the US-Canada 
border more quickly and with fewer referrals to secondary inspection. A number of factors limit this 
program’s potential to improve border performance. Because the cost of qualifying for FAST 
exceeds the benefits for many shipments, a mix of qualified and unqualified shipments shares a 
common queue at many crossings. This limits the time savings for qualified shipments. Also, since 
the decision to become qualified confers both external and internal benefits, the proportion of 
qualified shipments is inefficiently low from a system-wide perspective. Policy suggestions include 
coordination of crossing infrastructure to eliminate the common queue problem and targeted 
subsidies to offset the cost of becoming prequalified. 
Introduction 
The Free and Secure Trade (FAST) Program provides accelerated commercial clearance lanes at US 
land borders. Trucks that qualify to use the FAST lanes are released more quickly and have less 
frequent referrals to secondary inspection. While there are bilateral FAST programs with both 
Canada and Mexico, the focus of this paper is on US-Canada FAST. 
 
For a shipment to qualify for FAST clearance, its driver must be pre-screened and its importer, 
carrier and other supply chain partners must be members of the Customs Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT) for shipments entering the US or Partners in Protection (PIP) for shipments 
entering Canada. Each of these programs requires certification of a high level of security procedures 
at all points in the supply chain, which implies significant incremental cost.  In deciding whether to 
become members, firms have to weigh these costs against the benefits of having access to the FAST 
program.i (In what follows I will refer to the decisions of firms “to qualify,” meaning the decision to 
incur the costs necessary to become a member of C-TPAT, PIP or both. Note that this decision also 
entails the requirement to hire only FAST certified drivers and engage only other qualified firms as 
supply chain partners.)  
 
The FAST, C-TPAT and PIP have made significant gains in recent years. However, a large 
proportion of shipments at major Canada-US border crossings still do not qualify for the FAST 
lane. In what follows, I will make an argument that the proportion of FAST qualified shipments may 
be inefficiently low from a system-wide perspective.  This situation arises for two reasons. The first 
is that both the cost and benefits of qualifying varies across firms depending upon their size and the 
nature of the transportation services they provide, so some will choose to qualify while others will 
not. The second is that the decisions to qualify confers benefits not only on the firm itself, but also 
on other firms making shipments through the same border crossing. In other words, the firm bears 
the full cost of qualifying but it does not reap the full benefit. Understanding the roots of this 
inefficiency provides insights into possible policy strategies. 
 
Variation in cost 
The cost of qualifying on a per shipment basis will tend to be higher for small firms than for large 
firms. To illustrate, consider the case of a road carrier. In order to become a member of C-TPAT or 
PIP it may need to upgrade fencing and lighting at its main facility, install surveillance equipment, 
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hire and train security staff, etc. These are not fixed costs per se, but there are significant scale 
economies. For example, the main gate will require the same level of staffing and surveillance 
equipment whether 30 trucks or 300 trucks pass through it on a typical day.  
 
The existence of scale economies is borne out by information in a survey of C-TPAT members 
(Diop and Hartman, 2007.) Data in table V-22 of that report indicate that for the largest category of 
implementation cost – “improving physical security” – the average for firms with sales under 10 
million was $16,739, while the average for firms with sales above 10 billion was $98,673. Revenue 
for firms in the latter category was at least 1000 times revenue for firms in the former category, but 
their implementation costs were only 6 times as high! This suggests that membership is more cost-
effective for larger firms.  
 
Variation in benefit 
According to the same survey, member firms rate “reducing the time and cost of getting cargo 
released by CBP” and “reduced time and cost in CBP secondary cargo inspection lines” as the main 
benefits of C-TPAT membership. Thus, the decision to qualify is largely driven by comparing the 
value of these benefits against the costs. These benefits vary significantly across firms, depending 
upon the goods they are moving. We can define three categories of goods for which these benefits 
would be especially high. The first is perishable goods, including fresh produce and live animals. The 
second is components in just-in-time supply chains, where late delivery of goods can result in 
disruptions in production. (This is especially relevant in the automotive industry, where many supply 
chains straddle the Canada-US border – see Andrea and Smith, 2002.) The third category is all high 
value goods. A common strategy for insuring against supply disruptions due to border delays is to 
hold buffer inventories on both sides of the border. This cost of holding inventories increases with 
the value of the goods in question. (The three categories are not mutually exclusive; many shipments 
will fall under both the second and third categories.)  
 
In all cases, it is not only the average crossing time but also the variability in crossing times that 
matters. In supply chains it is often less important to get goods to their destination quickly than to 
get them to their destination within narrowly defined time windows.ii In the current environment, 
when average crossing times are relatively low, variability may be a greater concern than average 
time. 
 
Given that there is significant variation across firms in both costs and benefits, it is not possible to 
make a blanket statement as to whether qualification for the FAST program is a cost-effective 
business strategy. For small firms that typically handle goods that are not highly time sensitive it may 
not be, while for large firms that handle goods in any of the three categories mentioned above it 
almost certainly will be. For example, shipments in automotive supply chains have a very high rate 
of FAST qualification. These supply chains involve relatively large firms moving high value goods 
through very demanding just-in-time systems. Because of these variations, we can expect to see a 
combination of qualified and non-qualified trucksiii in cross-border trade for the foreseeable future. 
 
Common queues and external benefits. 
Since not all shipments are FAST-qualified, a mix of qualified and non-qualified trucks may share a 
common queue at a border crossing.  The simple figure below illustrates a situation where there is a 
single lane for trucks leading up to an inspection plaza with separate lanes for FAST and non-FAST 
commercial clearance. Trucks are released more quickly from the FAST clearance lane. In the other 
inspection lane, clearance is slower and at times the queue for that lane may become long enough to  
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create a queue in the single lane leading up to the plaza. Because all trucks are delayed in that queue, 
FAST qualified trucks reap smaller benefits than would be possible if they had a dedicated lane 
leading to the plaza. At some bridges (such as the Blue Water) a dedicated lane exists, while at other 
(such as the Ambassador) the situation is something like the figure. Even where there is a dedicated 
lane on the bridge, the non-Fast queue may be long enough to affect access roads, so FAST 
qualified trucks are not completely immune from delays. In general, the existence of a common 
queue reduces the benefits of becoming FAST qualified and thereby reduces the proportion of 
qualified shipments. 
 
There is another, more subtle aspect to this situation. Because it is generally the ordinary inspection 
line, rather than the FAST inspection line, that backs up to cause queuing in the common lane, the 
higher the proportion of FAST qualified trucks crossing the bridge, the smaller the delays 
experienced by all trucks – FAST and non-FAST – in the common queue. So by choosing to 
become FAST qualified, a firm achieves time savings not only for its own shipments but also for the 
shipments of other firms. This is what economists call an external benefit: a benefit that one person’s 
actions confer on another person, for which the first person is not compensated. External benefits 
generally do not figure in the decision making of firms. There may be firms for whom the cost of 
becoming qualified is greater than the private benefit, but less than the sum of the private and 
external benefits. Such firms will probably not become qualified, which implies that from a system-
wide perspective, the rate of qualification is inefficiently low.iv 
 
Policy implications 
The common queue problem described above almost certainly has a negative effect on the rate at 
which importers and supply chain firms choose to become members of C-TPAT / PIP and to 
qualify for the FAST program, although to my knowledge there is no information on the magnitude 
of this effect. From a policy perspective there are two general strategies for addressing the problem. 
The first is to eliminate common queues, or at least to extend dedicated FAST lanes as far as 
possible upstream from the FAST point of clearance. The second is to provide incentives to firms 
who might not otherwise become qualified. If this yields a significant increase in the proportion of 
qualified shipments, common queues will be less likely to form and will be shorter when they do 
form. 
 
As to the first strategy, it would be easy but not very helpful to recommend that the problem of 
common queues could be solved by adding dedicated FAST lanes across all bridges and extending 
those lanes a mile or so up the access roads. But there may be ways to make more efficient use of 
existing or planned infrastructure. Imagine a situation where there are two bridges across the same 
boundary river, each with two lanes in each direction. No single bridge would be able to offer a 
FAST 
inspection 
Ordinary 
inspection 
FAST qualified truck 
Non- qualified truck 
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dedicated FAST lane because it would need one lane for trucks and one for cars. If the two bridges 
cooperate in the use of their aggregate of four lanes in each direction, however, they could designate 
one lane for FAST trucks, one for non-FAST trucks, and perhaps divide the remaining two lanes 
between NEXUS and non-NEXUS cars. This approach requires two things: more than one crossing 
facility in close enough proximity to be reasonable substitutes and institutional arrangements to 
make coordination of lane assignments possible.  
 
We can see an application of this general strategy in practice. The Niagara Falls Bridge Commission, 
which controls three bridges, has assigned a dedicated FAST lane on the Lewiston-Queenston 
Bridge that extends a mile up the access road on the Canadian side. It has also designated the smaller 
capacity Whirlpool Bridge exclusively for NEXUS subscribers.   
 
Eliminating the common queue is not currently possible at the Ambassador Bridge (the largest truck 
crossing) because it has only two lanes in each direction. If the plans developed under the Detroit 
River International Crossing study come to fruition, the number of lanes in each direction in the 
Windsor-Detroit corridor will increase from 2 to 5,v making a long, dedicated FAST lane possible. 
However, that would require cooperation between the new bridge, which is planned as a Public 
Private Partnership, and the existing bridge, which is privately owned. Despite the well-known poor 
relations between the Ambassador Bridge and the DRIC initiative, policy makers should not lose 
sight of the significant benefits that eventual cooperation between the two bridges could have for 
the FAST program. 
 
The second strategy seeks to tackle the problem created by the external benefits of qualification.  
Economic efficiency is best served if the costs of qualification are incurred up to the point where 
they equal the benefits. Since some benefits are external, and therefore not counted in the decision 
of individual firms, system wide efficiency would be served if a subsidy were provided to those firms 
who might decide to qualify if they were able to recoup the value of the external benefits.vi One 
might go a step further and say that the subsidies should be funded by a tax on those that reap the 
benefits, in particular firms that make non-qualified shipments.  
 
Such a program of subsidy could increase the rate of qualification even among firms that do not 
receive subsidies. Since the common queue problem would be reduced, the internal benefits of 
qualification would increase for all firms, so the policy-induced increase in qualifications would 
trigger further decisions to qualify via normal market forces. The idea is to kick off a virtuous cycle 
of increased qualification. 
 
This is fine in theory but there are problems in the implementation. For one thing it will be difficult 
to identify those marginal firms that might be induced to qualify by a small subsidy. Also, it is 
unlikely that the subsidy could be funded in the theoretically preferred manner. Since qualification is 
not economically efficient for many firms, it would be perceived as unfair to label them as “free 
riders” and charge them a penalty for not qualifying. Thus it would probably be necessary to justify 
an expenditure of public money. (One might find, however, that this expenditure would provide 
time savings at a rate that is cheap when compared to time savings from infrastructure projects.) 
 
There are some concrete steps that can be taken in the direction of such a policy. The first is an 
assessment of the external benefits of FAST qualification, which might be undertaken in 
conjunction with ongoing efforts to monitor border crossing times. If these external benefits are 
found to be very small, then the policy is probably not worth pursuing. Another step is a broader 
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assessment of the costs and benefits of qualification in the full population of importers, carriers and 
other supply chain firms involved in cross-border commerce. The 2007 survey on C-TPAT 
members is useful in this regard, but it is also necessary to analyze responses from firms that choose 
not to become members. The goal of such a study would be to identify the profile of firms that 
would have the greatest potential to respond to modest incentives for qualification.  
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Endnotes 
 
i There are other benefits to consider as well. Membership in C-TPAT or PIP will yield private benefits in 
terms of cargo security and reduced insurance premiums. Members can use program logos, which convey 
a positive image from a marketing perspective. Firms may also wish to become members for the altruistic 
reason of contributing to national security in both countries. 
ii This theme is explored in greater detail, with data on recent crossing times, in Anderson and Coates, 2009. 
iii A non-qualified truck is one that cannot use the FAST lane with its current load. A truck belonging to a 
qualified carrier would still be non-qualified if its load is goods imported by a firm that is not a C-TPAT 
member. So the same truck may be qualified on one crossing and non-qualified on another. 
iv This idea is explored more formally and in greater depth in Anderson, 2009. 
v If the plans for the new bridge and replacement of the Ambassador Bridge both come to fruition, the 
number of lanes will increase to 6 in each direction. 
vi The governments of Canada and Quebec currently provide subsidies to help Canadian importers and 
carriers meet the requirements of C-TPAT. The Canada subsidies are in the form of loans while the 
Quebec subsidies are grants. 
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Near Border Operations and Logistical Efficiency:  Implications for Policy 
Makers 
Anne Goodchild and Matthew Klein 
 
Introduction 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that logistical inefficiencies are created by the border, increasing truck 
miles travelled, empty truck travel, and air emissions.  While these dynamics are poorly understood, 
we recognize that these logistics are not improved by the border.  By near border logistics we refer 
not to delays due to queuing at the border itself, but the routing changes, schedule impacts, and 
added stops and transfers that would not exist without the border.  This paper describes logistics 
practices near the US-Canada border at Blaine, Washington, discovered through a recent survey of 
border crossers, identifies the greatest source of logistical inefficiency, and suggests a policy change 
that would improve border operations, reducing truck miles travelled, emissions, and delay. 
 
Background 
This research was enabled by a data collection effort regarding near border operations for 
commercial vehicles at the Pacific Highway Border Crossing between British Columbia, Canada, and 
Washington, United States (see Figure 1).  The data collection and analysis effort was supported by a 
consortium of agencies and organizations concerned about border delay and inefficient border 
operations.  This consortium includes researchers at the University of Washington, the Border 
Policy Research Institute at Western Washington University, and the International Mobility and 
Trade Corridor (IMTC) Project which is convened by the Whatcom Council of Governments.  
IMTC members include US Customs and Border Protection, the Canadian Border Services Agency, 
Washington State DOT, British Columbia Ministry of Transport, and other regional and local 
organizations concerned about cross-border trade and transportation.   
 
Current near border operations practice is not well understood by policy makers, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that due to differences in size and weight restrictions, corporate structures, driver 
work rules, business models, international trade regulations, and communication mechanisms, 
significant logistical inefficiencies exist near the border.  For example, through interviews with 
regional carriers we are aware that significant numbers of drivers are unwilling or legally unable to 
cross the border, that carriers must dedicate specific vehicles in their fleet to cross-border operations 
to meet both region’s standards, and/or choose to meet the more restrictive standard for weight and 
combination when crossing and travelling in the other region.  The recent survey and data analysis 
enables 1) an evaluation of the logistical inefficiencies created by the border, 2) identification of 
obstacles to reducing empty truck miles, and 3) suggestions for changes to border policy that will 
improve near border logistics by reducing empty truck miles, border delay, and their associated air 
emissions.   
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Figure 1. Regional Map identifying the study location at Pacific Highway. 
 
Trip Patterns: Backhauls and Empty Trips 
The US and Canada have shared a strong trade relationship for decades.  In 2009, US imports from 
Canada were valued at almost $225 billion dollars, and US exports to Canada were valued at just 
over $200 billion.  While there is some seasonal variation, values for June 2009 demonstrate this 
same relationship, with just over $18 billion in southbound trade and almost $17 billion in 
northbound trade.  For goods moving only by truck, the US exports more to Canada (almost $12 
billion in June 2009) than is imported from Canada (just over $8 billion), due to significant US 
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imports of energy products which do not move by truck.  For trade only between Washington and 
British Columbia (BC), the relationship is more imbalanced, with Washington exporting to BC more 
than twice as much as it imports from BC.  This ratio is maintained if we consider imports and 
exports not just from Washington, but also Oregon and California, and if we consider not only BC, 
but also Alberta (all data from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics). 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the majority of trips crossing at Blaine originate from or are destined to, 
a short distinance within Canada, while destinations and origins in the United States are much more 
widely distributed.  This influences the incentives for Canadian and US carriers to seek backhaul 
opportunities, or to fill their trucks on return trips.  It also affects the possibility of finding such 
opportunities, which should be easier when logistical activities are concentrated in one geographic 
region. 
 
 
Figure 2. Distances driven to and from the border. 
 
From Figure 3 we can observe that southbound loads are significantly more successful at obtaining 
backhaul loads than northbound loads.  This is certainly influenced by the fact that trips originating 
in Canada and entering the US have much longer backhaul distances and therefore a much stronger 
incentive to find revenue for their return trip.   In addition, given the imbalance of trade in the 
region, we expect that there are a larger number of northbound loads.  However this creates a 
situation where significant numbers of empty trucks cross the border, creating congestion and delay.   
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Figure 3. Backhaul status by initial country. 
 
The blue sections in Figure 4 represent efficient trips that backhauled. The red sections reflect trips 
that were empty for half of their journey.  This clearly shows the magnitude of the empty truck 
problem.  We can also observe which industries are more effective at finding backhauls, for example 
the wood products and manufaturing sectors, but some industries are unsuccessful at obtaining 
backhaul opportunities, for example farm and energy products.  Figure 5 shows that typically carriers 
travel less than 25 miles to pick-up a backhaul trip.  However, some are willing to travel very long 
distances to pick-up backhauled cargo.   
 
 
Figure 4. Efficient trips by commodity and initial delivery direction. 
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Figure 5. Repositioning distance to pickup a backhaul load by commodity and country. 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests goods may be staged near the border, so that equipment or drivers can 
be exchanged prior to the crossing.  To some extent the concentration of origins and destinations 
within 25 miles of the border presents evidence of staging, but this also reflects the geography of the 
Vancouver region and it’s role as an importing port for Canada and Surrey, the location with 
concentrated logistics activity, as a logical location for this activity relative to Vancouver.   
 
The imbalance of trade and concentration of activity near the border in Canada imply limited 
impacts from Canadian cabotage laws.  However in the US, cabotage rules create greater 
inefficiencies. 
 
Size and Weight Restrictions:   
Gross vehicle weight in British Columbia can be up to 140,000 pounds, whereas in Washington the 
limit is 105,500 pounds.  The province and the state have similar restrictions on long combination 
vehicles.  Given that the travel distances into Canada are not typically long distance, most vehicles 
opt to meet the Washington standard and travel lighter than they could within British Columbia.  
While this has some impact on operational efficiency, the impacts are not large.   
Free and Secure Trade 
Figures 6 and 7 show that a minority of trucks use the Free and Secure Trade Lane (FAST).  We can 
also see that southbound deliverers were more successful at finding backhaul opportunities, especially 
those using the FAST lane.  The population least successful at obtaining backhaul are those using 
the general purpose lane to make a northbound delivery. 
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Figure 6. Southbound delivery  .  Figure 7. Northbound delivery 
 
Figure 8 shows the proportion of empty trucks in the FAST lane and in the general purpose lanes.  
The larger blue bars in the two left columns indicate more empty trucks in the FAST lane than the 
general purpose lane.  If we include the unknowns as empties southbound, then a majority of trucks 
in this lane carry no cargo.  The trusted traveler program that can save time crossing the border is 
supporting significant empty truck travel, which increases vehicle miles travelled, emissions, and 
border congestion. 
 
 
Figure 8. Full or empty status for FAST and all-purpose lanes. 
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Figure 9 indicates that northbound FAST infrastructure is used fairly equally by US and Canadian 
carriers (although the population is small), but southbound FAST is used predominately by U.S. 
Carriers.  
 
 
Figure 9. FAST use by carrier country and direction of travel 
 
 
Figure 10. Deliveries by location and commodity type (for first delivery). 
Un-necessary Stops 
To what extent does the border create un-necessary stops at regional logistics facilities?   
 
Each trip must originate at the cargo’s source, and ultimately arrive at the receiver’s business 
location.  While some intermediate stops are made at warehousing and distribution center locations 
for cost and inventory efficiencies, these trips increase vehicle miles travelled and the associated 
social costs (emissions, fuel consumption, noise pollution, safety concerns).  Assuming trips made to 
receiver’s business locations, intermodal facilities, farms or raw materials locations, or distribution 
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centers are classified as necessary stops, and would occur whether the border existed or not, we can 
identify the percentage of trips made to trucking company facilities.  Trips to a trucking company 
facility may demonstrate unnecessary trips generated by the border, but may also be made for 
sorting or repackage activities which reduce logistics costs.  Figures 10 (for delivery) and 11 (for 
pickup) show that stops at trucking company facilities are in the minority, and general only present 
for manufactured and miscellaneous goods, which would often be sorted or repackaged, so it does 
not appear that the border is generating a large number of un-necessary stops at near border 
facilities. 
 
 
Figure 11. Pickups by location and commodity type (for last pickup). 
Recommendations 
Upon completing the near border operations analysis, it appears the greatest source of inefficiency 
comes from the prevalence of empty trucks in the region and crossing the border.  If empty trip 
rates could be reduced, the region would see reduced vehicle miles travelled, reduced border 
congestion, and reduced emissions.   
 
Inadvertently, the FAST program encourages empty truck travel, and the short distances into 
Canada reduce incentives for firms to find backhaul opportunities given the cost of coordination.  
Policies that increase the cost of empty truck trips at the border would provide additional incentive 
to reduce empty truck trips and encourage carriers to find backhaul opportunities.  For example, not 
allowing empty trucks to use the FAST lane, increased fuel prices, or increased mileage taxes. 
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Digest of Audience Discussion: 
• Empties and backhaul in the I-5 corridor.  The specialization of individual rigs complicates 
the procurement of backhaul – e.g., not much can be done with a truck that hauls swine.  The 
IMTC 2009 CVO data implies that flatbeds are best able to arrange backhaul.  The data also 
indicates that backhaul is most prevalent within the wood products sector.  There have been 
numerous attempts to establish systems that allow scheduling of backhaul, and all have 
failed.  Another factor is that load and trip characteristics in the corridor (i.e., the fact that the 
Vancouver metro area, which is all within 30 miles of the border, is the origin of most 
southbound trips and the destination of most northbound ones) are not conducive to 
procurement of backhaul.  The relative costs of an empty trip (fuel, etc.) are not so high that 
carriers are motivated to find backhaul.  Cabotage is probably less of a factor than these cost-
related factors.  Should costs escalate, the situation might change. 
• Notion of commercial-only ports.  This was attempted once in the I-5 region, and the duty-
free operators immediately exercised political pressure that shut off all discussion.  And, 
generally, the reduced truck volumes today mean that autos are “in the driver’s seat.”  Should 
autos experience greater delay because of the removal of a previously available crossing 
point, the political pressure would likewise be severe. 
• Insufficient FAST benefits.  There is dissatisfaction among the FAST community about the 
extent to which their loads continue to be taken to secondary.  However, organized crime 
views a trusted-shipper as an attractive target.  Verification of compliance of FAST loads 
must still be achieved in some manner. 
• Space at a premium at POEs.  The availability of space at Fort Erie was the impetus for the 
failed pre-clearance initiative.  At Blaine and Sumas, the best chunks of vacant space also are 
found in Canada adjacent to the border, constituting parking lots used by truckers for visits to 
brokers in the era prior to e-manifest.  Can those parking lots be repurposed?  The successful 
deployment of CBP’s rail VACIS within Canada at the Detroit crossing is significant.  Could 
VACIS and RPMs be deployed in Canada at other locations, with enforcement activity 
occurring only after a truck crossed the border? 
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Governing the 49th Parallel:  Recommendations for US Policymakers on 
Northern Border Governance   
Kathryn Bryk Friedman  
Abstract 
Recent strides have been made between Canada and the United States on collaboratively governing 
the border.  However, border governance also involves establishing or fine tuning mechanisms, 
institutions and processes internal to the United States.  This briefing paper argues that, as the main 
driver of northern border policy, the United States, and the Department of Homeland Security in 
particular, must continue to get its own house in order when it comes to northern border 
governance, in addition to acting collaboratively with Canada.  The focus of this briefing is on 
practical ways to establish governance mechanisms within the United States to better address the 
interplay between security and economic interests – establishing a Northern Border Advisory Task 
Force within the Department of Homeland Security. 
Introduction 
Over the past year or so, the northern border has taken a back seat in Washington, D.C. politics and 
policymaking. With final implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative completed in 
2009 and attention focused on seemingly more pressing domestic and international priorities, a sense 
of resignation about the border exists among certain policymakers and stakeholders in the United 
States.  This is particularly true when it comes to thinking about ways to facilitate and enhance 
commercial flows of people, goods and services across the border.  There is a sense that emphasis 
on security at the expense of legitimate flows is taking a devastating toll on U.S. economic 
competitiveness, especially given the highly integrated nature of the Canadian and U.S. economies 
(we “make stuff together”), and the fact that $1.5 billion in goods flow daily across the border.  
From an economic perspective, what does the border look like today?1  On the one hand, the post 
9-11 border reflects problems in the trenches, including increased costs and delays for passenger and 
commercial flows due to intensified inspection procedures; regulations like APHIS and 10+2 that 
increase transaction costs to producers and shippers; misallocation of resources; and lack of 
investment in aging infrastructure.  Border policy recommendations are couched in terms of risk 
management and, for the most part, directed toward discrete challenges of the day such as 
implementing new processes and technologies and harmonizing credentials to reduce out-of-pocket 
costs for the trucking industry.  On the other hand, when longer-term thinking is considered, 
researchers recommend a smorgasbord of institutional structures, ranging from creating a Joint 
Border Commission to establishing mechanisms that engage regional and state-provincial actors.     
Current thinking on border policy, although useful, is limited.  First, it represents a “finger in the 
dike” approach – recommendations and actions address current challenges and short-term solutions 
                                                 
1
 Kathryn Bryk Friedman, “The Border After 9/11” in 31 Policy Options 2 (Feb. 2010).   
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but are insufficient for crafting a long-term, comprehensive approach to border policy.  Second, 
each of the longer-term institutional recommendations is plausible, however, whether one is pursued 
over another will depend upon how Canada and the United States resolve fundamental border 
governance questions in the post-September 11th world.  That is: 
• How do these actors organize and act to establish a vision on border policy? 
• How are resources allocated?   
• How are goals achieved?   
• Most pertinently, how do the actors negotiate the interplay between security and 
economic interests?   
Border governance, as suggested above, is inherently a collective enterprise, to be addressed by the 
United States and Canada collaboratively.  Recognizing this reality, the Obama Administration has 
taken steps in this regard, for example, by formalizing twice yearly dialogue between the Department 
of Homeland Security Secretary and Public Safety Canada Minister on border issues.   
Governing the border, however, also involves establishing or fine tuning mechanisms, institutions 
and processes internal to the United States.  This briefing paper argues that, as the main driver of 
northern border policy, the United States, and the Department of Homeland Security in particular, 
must continue to get its own house in order when it comes to northern border governance, in 
addition to acting collaboratively with Canada.  The focus of this briefing is on practical ways to 
establish governance mechanisms within the United States to better address the interplay between 
security and economic interests.  Border policy historically has contended with these two interests, 
however, twenty-first century forces of globalization – both the beneficial and the dark – exacerbate 
this tension  and put a point on inherent tradeoffs between the desire to maximize prosperity yet 
minimize risks posed by terrorism and other transnational threats.   
Border Governance Within the United States:  Current Landscape 
Although most inside and outside of Washington, D.C. are familiar with the origins of the 
Department of Homeland Security, it is important to underscore the history, vision and mission of 
DHS, as these frame current expectations and options when it comes to governing the northern 
border.  On the US side of the border, efforts in the immediate post-September 11th environment 
focused on centralizing border governance into the bureaucratic driver of northern border policy – 
the Department of Homeland Security.2  Eleven days after the terrorist attacks, President George W. 
Bush announced that he would create an Office of Homeland Security in the White House and 
appoint Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as the director. The office would oversee and 
coordinate a comprehensive national strategy to safeguard the country against terrorism and respond 
                                                 
2 The following history of the organization of the Department of Homeland Security is taken from Department of 
Homeland Security History Office, Brief Documentary History of the Department of Homeland Security, 2001-2008 
(http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/brief_documentary_history_of_dhs_2001_2008.pdf).    
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to any future attacks.  In an address to the nation in June 2002, President Bush outlined the contours 
of a permanent Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security to protect the United States.  He 
set forth four essential missions that corresponded to the four proposed divisions in the department, 
one of which was border security.  The mission of this division was to control the borders and 
prevent terrorists and explosives from entering the country.  
Myriad executive orders were subsequently promulgated and legislation proposed, all of which 
resulted in President Bush signing the Homeland Security Act of 2002 into law on November 25, 
2002. The Department of Homeland Security became operational on January 24, 2003, sixty days 
after the Homeland Security Act was passed.  Organizational changes ensued over the next two 
years, with border and transportation security all the while remaining at the top of the helm.    
A September 2008 strategic plan sets forth the vision, core values and goals of DHS.3  The vision of 
DHS is “[a] secure America, a confident public, and a strong and resilient society and economy.”4  
Reinforcing this vision but, also recognizing implicitly and explicitly economic interest in border 
policy, the mission of DHS is to “lead the unified national effort to secure America … prevent and 
deter terrorist attacks … protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation [and] 
secure our national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade” (emphasis supplied).5  In 
further recognition of the need to negotiate security and economic interests, one objective of the 
strategic plan states that the department will make border security stronger while “facilitating legitimate 
travel, migration, and continued expansion of commerce” (emphasis supplied).    The February 2010 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report not only reinforces recognition by DHS of its trade 
facilitation objective ( “We view security along with customs and exchange as mutually reinforcing 
and inextricably intertwined through actions such as screening, authenticating, and maintaining 
awareness of the flow of people, goods, and information around the world and across our 
borders”6), but takes this responsibility one step further, stating that this objective, among the 
others, is “enterprise wide,” i.e., state, local, tribal, territorial governments, as well as the private 
sector and NGOS, are responsible for executing mission (in addition to the federal government).7  
There is, according to DHS, now “a greater emphasis on and need for joint actions and efforts 
across previously discrete elements of government and society.”8 
Thus, when it comes to border governance, expectations should take into account that DHS is 
doing what it was established to do – secure borders.  However, the door is now open for better 
negotiating and accommodating economic interests.   
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Strategic Plan:  One Team, One Mission, Securing Our Homeland (hereinafter 
“Strategic Plan”) (http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/strategicplan).   
4 Strategic Plan, at 3.   
5 Strategic Plan, at 6. 
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report:  A Strategic Framework for a Secure 
Homeland (hereinafter “Quadrennial Review”)  (http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf at 16).   
7 U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Review, at iii, iv, v, viii, 3, 12. 
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Review, at 11. 
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Border Governance Within the United States:  Proposed Changes  
As briefly described above, the centralization that occurred in the United States in the aftermath of 
September 11th was monumental, yet it left out of the mix different interests reflecting legitimate 
travel and commerce.  To date, private sector and binational regional voices do not have a seat at the 
table when it comes to northern border policymaking – voices that are critical to making border 
policy that successfully and artfully negotiates the tradeoff between trade and security.  As noted in 
the Decennial Review, engagement and collaboration are critical to DHS successfully fulfilling its 
mission.   
The contours of a border governance framework that better negotiates the tradeoff between security 
and economy can take place between the bureaucracy and other interests.  Following is a modest 
governance recommendation for consideration that does not involve legislation, rather, it suggests 
establishing a mechanism to better negotiate the interplay between security and economic interests 
when it comes to northern border governance: 
Establish a Northern Border Advisory Task Force within the Department of Homeland 
Security.  Currently, the Department of Homeland Security has several advisory panels and 
committees established to help formulate policy:  1) the Homeland Security Advisory Council; 2) 
National Infrastructure Advisory Council; 3) Homeland Security Science and Technology 
Advisory Committee; 4) Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council; 5) Interagency 
Coordinating Council on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities and 6) Task 
Force on New Americans.  It, however, does not have a mechanism focused primarily on 
northern border economic interests.  Falling under the Homeland Security Advisory Council and 
complementing the already-established Southwest Border Task Force, Northern Border 
Advisory Task Force membership would include private sector, academic and binational regional 
interests.  It would meet periodically to offer recommendations to DHS on better negotiating 
the interplay between security and economic interests as they relate to the northern border, 
clarifying tradeoffs, mining alternative perspectives and debating positions and policy options.  
How can efficiencies at the border be best achieved?  What are the choices and impacts of 
different border governance scenarios?  What are the tradeoffs between economy and security?  
What would be an effective northern border governance strategy that incorporates economic 
interests?  Serving as a public-private forum to ensure that private sector and binational regional 
interests have a voice in formulating border policy of the United States, this mechanism would 
further legitimize and strengthen economic interests in the northern border.      
At the end of the day, policymakers must come up with a way to govern the 49th parallel that better 
negotiates security and economic interests. Finding the right balance will be tricky, but it is necessary 
to our economic recovery and prosperity.  Unlike September 11th, which was a shock to the nation 
and world, the inability to accommodate economic interests into the border governance equation is 
akin to a slow burn.  Although insidious, it can – and potentially will be – just as devastating. 
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Tackling a Neglected Mission:  Facilitation of Legitimate Trade and Travel 
David Davidson 
 
 
In the post-9/11 era there has been a constant refrain from those engaged in cross-border 
commerce that “security has trumped trade” to an extent that is damaging to our integrated North 
American economy.  This refrain has grown louder in the aftermath of the deep economic recession 
that began two years ago.  Recent reports from academia, think-tanks, and the private sector have 
urgently called for new efforts to facilitate cross-border trade in order to preserve our 
competitiveness within the global economy, and thus preserve our way of life.1 
 
Kathryn Friedman has noted that the primacy of security is by intention.  Reviewing the birth of the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the evolution of its mission, she concludes that DHS 
is “doing what it was established to do.”2  She reviewed documents up through and including DHS’s 
September 2008 strategic plan.   
 
Last month, though, DHS published the inaugural edition of the Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review Report (QHSR).  The QHSR purports to be the document that identifies DHS’s vision of 
what constitutes homeland security and of how that vision is pursued through implementation of 
various missions and goals.  The QHSR is a notable document in that it makes prominent reference 
to the notion of economic security as being a vital component of homeland security.  The very first 
paragraph of the executive summary notes: 
 
A safe and secure homeland must mean more than preventing terrorist attacks from being carried out.  It 
must also ensure that the liberties of all Americans are assured, privacy is protected, and the means by which 
we interchange with the world—through travel, lawful immigration, trade, commerce, and exchange—are 
secured. 
 
Within the section related to securing and managing our borders, the QHSR advocates working with 
international partners and the private sector to “reduce unnecessary encumbrances to lawful travel 
and trade that may impair economic vitality.”  These statements show that DHS understands the 
pitfalls of a security paradigm that throttles trade.  They also show a willingness to launch new 
efforts to expedite lawful commerce.  How, then, should DHS proceed, given that at heart it is a 
vast para-military organization that has thus far focused essentially upon security? 
 
In this paper I advocate two practical steps that can be quickly taken:  (1) funding of extramurally 
facilitated regional stakeholder forums, and (2) establishment of a Center of Excellence for Trade 
and Travel Facilitation.  Both of these suggestions are consistent with DHS’s objective of working 
with partners to reduce unnecessary encumbrances to commerce. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Examples include:  Toward a New Frontier:  Improving the U.S. – Canadian Border, published in 2009 by the Brookings 
Institution; Finding the Balance:  Shared Border of the Future, published in 2009 by the Canadian and U.S. Chambers of 
Commerce; A New Bridge for Old Allies, published in 2008 by the Canadian International Council; and In Search of Effective 
Border Management, published in 2009 by the Canadian International Council. 
2 Kathryn Bryk Friedman. “The Border After 9/11—Security Trumps All,” Policy Options, February 2010, p. 53 
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Stakeholder Forums 
 
In the 2009 Brookings report titled Toward a New Frontier, Chris Sands reviews the manner in which 
the important trade facilitation initiatives rolled out in the Shared Border Action Plan were actually 
developed through an extensive stakeholder consultation process that took place in the late 1990s.  
He also writes at length about the regional variations along the Canada – U.S. border and the 
concomitant need to craft solutions that are appropriate to the dynamics of a given region.  He 
concludes by advocating that DHS charge its local port directors to convene port-specific 
stakeholder committees, leading to mini-action-plans.  I offer a different opinion about where such 
committees should be established, and how they should be organized. 
 
The most successful existing port-specific stakeholder forum is the International Mobility and Trade 
Corridor (IMTC) project, which for 13 years has sought to foster mobility through the Cascade 
Gateway ports (Blaine, Lynden, Sumas) that serve the I-5 corridor linking B.C. and Washington 
State.  The forum is facilitated by the Whatcom Council of Governments (WCOG), a regional 
transportation planning entity based in Bellingham, 25 miles south of the border.  Within the IMTC 
framework, municipal and private-sector stakeholders regularly meet with transportation agencies and 
security agencies from all levels of government (i.e., state, provincial, federal).3  The IMTC succeeds 
because of the following factors: 
• Motivation.  People must be motivated to participate in such forums.  Unfortunately, the best 
motivation is impediments to mobility as evidenced by problems such as congestion and delays.  
It was problems at the Cascade Gateway that motivated people to sit down and talk.  The 
proposed forums make sense only at the crossings that receive heavy use and that are straining 
to meet the load.  Forums are unnecessary along much of the border’s breadth. 
• Proximity.  It must be convenient for people to attend meetings.  At the Cascade Gateway, all of 
the necessary stakeholders can reach a meeting after a drive of no more than two hours, given 
the proximity of Seattle and Vancouver to the border.  If a bureaucrat is forced to drive several 
hours each way (or attend via an airplane ride), the burden of attendance will eventually defeat 
the forum.  Forums make sense only where the necessary stakeholders are capable of easily 
attending the meetings. 
• Facilitation.  The stakeholders must find participation to be simple, with little or no preparation 
required of them.  This implies that tasks are going on in the background—tasks such as 
arranging venues, establishing agendas, communicating with participants (via email and website), 
memorializing progress, and facilitating the actual meeting.  The quality of the facilitation is 
crucial.  Stakeholders must perceive the forum as neutral, with all viewpoints welcome.  For the 
reasons mentioned in this paragraph, the use of CBP employees as facilitators will not work.  At 
the IMTC, a key to success has been the subject-area expertise, longevity, and neutrality of the 
facilitation offered by the WCOG. 
• Mindset of participants.  The participants must have a common vision of what they are trying to 
accomplish—greater cross-border mobility in combination with security that CBP finds to be 
appropriate to its mission.  Mindful that security personnel sometimes view “civilian” 
stakeholders with a degree of disdain, Chris Sands recommends that the performance 
evaluations of CBP port directors be based in part upon the relationship between a director and 
                                                 
3 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Canada Border Services Agency, B.C. Ministry of Transportation, WA State 
Department of Transportation, Transport Canada, U.S. Federal Highway Administration 
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the local stakeholders.  It is true that in the IMTC’s early days customs officials were skeptical of 
the forum’s value, but they are willing participants at this time, having seen the forum produce 
benefits that help them in their security mission. 
• Funding.  The WCOG operates the forum with two FTE staff, which obviously represents a cost 
burden.  The WCOG has twice been successful in securing long-term funding from the U.S. 
Dep’t. of Transportation via contracts tied to six-year highway appropriations programs.  The 
forum would have died years ago if the WCOG had had to scramble each year to secure 
funding.  A loss of funding for even a short period would have killed the forum. 
 
DHS, in consultation with each relevant state, should identify regional agencies that are appropriate 
facilitators of new forums.  Initial six-year contracts should be executed, so that each forum has a 
good chance to achieve success.  The following groups of ports are likely candidates for forums:  
Cascade Gateway (WA-BC), Port Huron/Detroit (MI-ON), Buffalo-Niagara (NY-ON), 
Ogdensburg/Massena/Alexandria Bay (NY-ON), Champlain (NY-QC), Highgate Springs/Derby 
Line (VT-QC), Calais/Milltown/Houlton (ME-NB).  These groupings incorporate busy crossings, 
are reachable by bureaucrats, and don’t place an undue burden upon any one state/province (each of 
which likely has a small cohort of staff capable of participating).  The annual cost of this initiative 
would be $1.7 million, including a DHS liaison officer.  
 
Center of Excellence 
 
The research capability provided by our universities has long been a vital component of America’s 
defense-related efforts, and DHS has recognized the value of enlisting academic expertise.  It has 
launched and funded twelve Centers of Excellence as a means of commissioning research into 
specific topics of concern: 
• Risk and Economic Analysis of 
Terrorism Events 
• Foreign Animal and Zoonotic Disease 
Defense 
• Food Protection and Defense 
• Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
• Advancing Microbial Risk Assessment 
• Study of Preparedness and Catastrophic 
Event Response 
• Awareness and Location of Explosives-
Related Threats 
• Border Security and Immigration 
• Maritime, Island and Remote and 
Extreme Environment Security 
• Natural Disasters, Coastal Infrastructure 
and Emergency Management 
• Transportation Security  
• Command, Control and Interoperability 
This list is convincing evidence of DHS’s focus to date upon a mission of interdiction and counter-
terrorism, implemented within a para-military paradigm.  Nowhere is there an emphasis upon the 
idea that facilitation of legitimate commerce is crucial to the nation’s economic vitality. 
 
A new Center of Excellence for Trade and Travel Facilitation should be formed.  As with other 
Centers, this one should include partner universities positioned to address the key trade corridors, 
including the auto-belt corridor (the crossings from Ontario to Michigan and New York), the 
Cascade Gateway, and the New England gateways.  These regional partners are vital in that they 
possess existing knowledge of the dynamics of regional economies and trade flows, and they offer 
efficient access to crossing points for the purpose of field research. 
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An advantage associated with DHS sponsorship of the Center is the ability to negotiate access to 
facilities and to government data.  In the normal course of operations, CBP collects data that would 
be of great use in the design of trade facilitation programs (e.g., ACE manifest data, data gathered by 
license plate readers).  That data is unavailable to an independent institute such as my own.  But, just 
as classified defense-related research is conducted at many universities today, partners in this Center 
could procure necessary security clearances and gain appropriate access to useful data. 
  
The cost of a new Center would be on the order of $3 million  per year, and DHS would obviously 
need to identify (or establish) an internal capability to coordinate the research agenda, liaise between 
the Center and DHS’s myriad branches in order to accomplish research tasks, and digest research 
products. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The above two suggestions offer a way that DHS could rapidly begin working with regional 
stakeholders and academia to reduce unnecessary encumbrances to lawful trade and travel across the 
Canada – U.S. border.  The Stakeholder Forums would help address the port-specific issues 
associated with infrastructure development (lanes, booths, signage, ITS, etc.) and operations (snow 
removal, emergency notification, etc.) at the busiest crossings.  The Center of Excellence would 
allow a means to analyze broader systemic issues (e.g., FAST program eligibility) and develop 
process innovations of wide applicability.  The combined cost would be on the order of $5 million 
per year—less than one hundredth of one percent of DHS’s annual $56 billion budget.  Dedicating 
this proportion of funding expressly to the pursuit of a mission of trade facilitation would surely be 
a useful counterbalance to the various initiatives undertaken to harden our borders.  As implied 
above, implementation of these suggestions would be for naught unless some office within DHS 
were tasked with the mission of eliminating undue encumbrances, and it is that office that should 
manage these two initiatives. 
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Learning from the Front Lines: Implementing CPI and TQM within CBP at 
the U.S.-Canada Border 
Christopher Sands 
 
 
One of the best sources for new ideas that would improve the operations of an organization is 
within the organization itself: the personnel charged with responsibility for day-to-day 
implementation of the organization’s mission.  
 
American scholar W. Edwards Deming observed this early in the twentieth century, sharing his 
approach to management by listening with Japanese firms as an advisor to General Douglas 
Macarthur during the postwar U.S. occupation of Japan. Only a few decades later, U.S. 
manufacturers spent the 1980s struggling to learn the process of kaizen – incremental improvements 
suggested by workers on the line to improve quality and efficiency and reduce costs – from Japanese 
companies.1 
 
Across the U.S. federal government, agencies have been tasked with improving the management of 
Federal Enterprises by adapting private sector management techniques including Continuous 
Process Improvement (CPI) and Total Quality Management (TQM, the American term for kaizen).  
 
In response to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) sought to promote CPI to improve use of quantitative metrics to 
improve the performance and reduce the cost of implementing government functions and instilling 
greater customer focus. The Department of Defense established Deputy Under Secretaries for 
Business Transformation for each of the armed services, giving them the resources to implement 
training and disseminate information so that soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines could study and 
improve their operations.  
 
The legacy agencies that were combined to form the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had 
a more limited experience in implementing CPI and TQM as a single organization in part because of 
the challenges of incorporating so many different organizations into a single department capable of 
working effectively to protect U.S. citizens from day 1 of the new department’s existence. In order 
to begin to continually improve a process, the process has to be studied and settled for at least a 
time. 
 
Today, CBP has the potential to adopt TQM and CPI at the U.S. northern border with Canada in 
order to mitigate some of the obstacles to commercial facilitation and individual border crossing that 
have become a drag on U.S. competitiveness while wasting CBP resources through unnecessarily 
prolonged inspection times. Doing so will involve the launching of two processes simultaneously. 
 
Total Quality Management. DHS should empower local federal officials, from CBP port directors to 
individual inspectors and members of the Border Patrol and US Coast Guard to communicate 
concerns and ideas for the improvement of operations. There must be a channel established for 
communication between front line officers and DHS senior management, and sufficient flexibility 
                                                 
1 James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones and Daniel Roos. The Machine that Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production 
(Rawson Associates, 1990) 
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for local federal officials to make adjustments and shift resources to implement incremental 
improvements.  
 
For example, CBP inspectors seeing a routine problem of access to booths due to the existing 
configuration of infrastructure or flow of traffic might provide insights into simple changes that 
reduce delays. An officer who must repeatedly correct travelers on the necessary documentation 
might recommend greater efforts at public education and outreach. Even something as simple as a 
change in the layout of equipment in an inspection booth or the placement of equipment on a 
customs plaza could improve operations and reduce the strain on a particular location. 
 
Resources must be flexible enough to permit experimentation, and if TQM within CBP is designed 
to resemble the private sector model, there should be recognition and even a monetary reward for 
ideas that result in cost savings or significant, measurable improvements. In addition, DHS will need 
to establish the means to share best practices throughout the organization including all land border 
crossings and patrol areas. 
 
Six Sigma (6σ)Analysis. In 1981, Motorola engineers pioneered Six Sigma analysis, an approach to 
TQM that could provide a model for its implementation within DHS units.2  The Six Sigma method 
begins with an executive-level commitment to quality and improvement. Top executives – in DHS 
terms, the Secretary – then name “champions” within senior management ranks for the quality and 
improvement initiative. The champions identify “agents” of change to form process improvement 
teams known as “black belt teams” because they are comprised of the top internal experts in the 
processes being analyzed. These teams follow a five-step assessment-correction path known by the 
acronym DMAIC: Define a process problem; Measure key aspects of the problem; Analyze the 
measured data to tease out causal relationships; Improve the process through pilot projects and 
experimental changes; Control future process implementation to correct for future defects 
immediately.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Thomas McCarthy, Michael Bremer, Praveen Gupta and Lorraine Daniels. The Six Sigma Black Belt Handbook (McGraw-
Hill, 2004) 
Motorola Six Sigma Method 
 
Define Problem – precision required 
 
Measure – quantify to identify 
 
Analyze – causes and linkages 
 
Improve/Optimize – experiment and apply best 
practice as proven 
 
Control – build-in mechanisms for adjustments to 
correct for defects quickly and efficiently 
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One of the main benefits of Six Sigma is that is provides a rigorous and inclusive model of engaging 
personnel across an organization in making improvements to the operational processes that 
implement the organization’s mission. Staff at all levels play a role in problem definition (often 
suggesting areas that need improvement that are invisible to those not immersed in a business 
process), measurement, design and implementation of pilot projects and experimental 
improvements, and finally in applying process controls to catch problems faster and generate 
corrections. 
  
Thanks to a push from the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, a number of the agencies of the 
federal government have adopted and adapted Six Sigma in the public sector. The U.S. military, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other national security agencies have experience with Six Sigma 
that DHS could draw upon. In addition, universities such as Villanova University market online 
degree programs in Six Sigma for public sector managers, enabling DHS to outsource training in the 
concepts of Six Sigma quickly and reliably 
 
Lean Management and Continuous Process Improvement. TQM (setting goals for the organization 
and prioritizing them in the way that the organization is managed) and Six Sigma (instituting internal 
mechanisms to refine business processes on an ongoing basis) taken together lead to a culture of 
continuous process improvement within an organization. CPI can be implemented in a variety of 
ways, but the simple four-step process developed by Deming is a logical starting point for DHS and 
its agencies. Known as the PDCA cycle, it involves four iterative steps: Plan, Do, Check (or Study), 
and Act.3  These steps are detailed in the box below. 
 
 
                                                 
3 W. Edwards Deming. Out of the Crisis (MIT Press, 1989) 
W. Edwards Deming’s PDCA Model for  
Business Process Improvement 
 
PLAN   
Establish the objectives and processes necessary to deliver results in accordance with 
the expected output. By making the expected output the focus, it differs from other 
techniques in that the completeness and accuracy of the specification is also part of the 
improvement.  
DO   
Implement the new processes. Often on a small scale if possible.  
CHECK   
Measure the new processes and compare the results against the expected results to 
ascertain any differences.  
ACT   
Analyze the differences to determine their cause. Each will be part of either one or 
more of the P-D-C-A steps. Determine where to apply changes that will include 
improvement. When a pass through these four steps does not result in the need to 
improve, refine the scope to which PDCA is applied until there is a plan that involves 
improvement.  
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To engage in a review of the business processes of a federal enterprise such as CBP, it is important 
to include not only DHS personnel (as in TQM implementation) but also to incorporate a process 
for stakeholder input in describing and assessing the processes being considered. Stakeholders such 
as regular local shippers, local Chambers of Commerce and business representatives such as tourism 
promoters, local political figures who can represent to CBP constituent concerns, as well as 
Canadian counterparts to CBP officials and these stakeholder groups. Although in some cases it will 
take time to overcome tensions with such groups, their engagement in a process of study to improve 
operations at a local level will build trust and greater respect over time. 
 
Prior to the establishment of DHS as a separate agency, interaction between US Customs port 
directors and local stakeholders was more common and relationships at the local level were allowed 
to foster pilot projects and incremental improvements without recourse to Washington , DC for 
prior authorization (except where significant resources were required, though in such cases a 
partnership with a private sector firm or group of firms willing to finance the experiment was often 
permitted – this was the case with the early development of what would be come the Automated 
Customs Environment, which began as a pilot project sponsored by Detroit automakers working 
with the Detroit Customs Port). 
 
This illustrates the challenge of Lean Enterprise Management, a contextualizing concept for TQM 
and Six Sigma. The idea of a Lean Enterprise is that it seeks to complete essential tasks with the 
minimum number of steps or decisions, and the minimum resource commitment whether measured 
in terms of staff or equipment or budget dollars. The long-term neglect of infrastructure at the U.S.-
Canadian border prior to the establishment of DHS gave the organization a mandate to expand 
capacity and devote increased resources to U.S. land border security and inspection.4  
 
Inevitably, public sector resources encounter limits, and the fiscal situation of the U.S. federal 
government suggests that DHS cannot expect to “do more with more” inevitably. In the private 
sector, this has been the impetus for organizations to adopt Lean Enterprise Management practices 
and they provide a means by which DHS can pivot from a period of expanded capabilities to more 
resource-efficient mission effectiveness. James Womack founded the Lean Enterprise Institute 
(www.lean.org) as a nonprofit repository of information on the application of lean enterprise ideas 
first developed in the auto industry – by Ford and Toyota, principally. LEI and other research 
organizations could provide DHS managers with ideas and practical advice on how to implement 
Lean management and extend the application of CPI in a more resource constrained future. 
 
DHS as a Learning Organization. The challenge for DHS is to tap into the knowledge of its front 
line officials not once, in a major push to improve, but to create a learning culture with the 
department and its constituent agencies that fosters experimentation and ongoing improvement on 
an incremental basis. In a sense, this is not a recommendation that DHS do anything more than to 
listen to its personnel and to local stakeholders, and to engage them in the process of improving the 
performance of its mission.  
 
The desired result is an improvement in the relationship between the organization and its people, 
and this in turn will improve the relationship between the organization and its customers. To be an 
organization that can learn, DHS must also be an organization that proves that it can listen. This 
                                                 
4 For more on this topic, see Christopher Sands. Toward a New Frontier: Improving the U.S.-Canadian Border (Brookings 
Institution, 2009) 
    35 
matters because in combating threats such as terrorism, smuggling, and human trafficking, 
actionable intelligence is the critical component of success. The best source of intelligence will be 
the observant DHS inspector and law-abiding stakeholders who operate in the border space. 
Building trust and solid relationships among these two groups will improve the flow of intelligence 
in support of the DHS mission even as it improves the performance of the mission from the 
perspective of efficiency. 
 
The next step for DHS will be to show that as an organization capable or learning and listening, 
DHS is also an organization that can change. Managing change throughout a large organization is 
always a challenge, especially in a national security organization like DHS that must put security at 
the forefront at all times. The consequences of a failure by DHS to protect Americans is 
catastrophic, and this is a powerful incentive for everyone at DHS to play it safe, resist change and 
defend a rigid status quo. Overcoming this risk-averse inertia starts with managed, monitored and 
controlled experimentation. Knowledge gathered through experimentation makes it possible to 
reduce the risk of unknown consequences of a change. 
 
It bears repeating that frequent local experimentation will result in a patchwork quilt of procedures 
and practices that will ultimately fragment the management of DHS border operations and result in 
confusion and the appearance of arbitrariness by stakeholders unless accompanied by a procedure for 
the assessment of ideas generated by TQM and CPI and the transmission of best practices across 
the organization. While the adjustment of traffic flow at a particular crossing may be a change 
without broader application to other crossings, other ideas will have to become part of the standard 
operating procedure for DHS border security elsewhere. 
 
The U.S.-Canadian border has frequently been praised for its ability to securely facilitate the flow of 
goods and people in the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world. At a time when President 
Obama has set a goal of increasing U.S. exports by 100 percent, the high-volume U.S. northern 
border will provide benchmarks and best practice models that should ideally help to improve the 
U.S.-Mexican border over time, as well as other inspection points throughout the United States and 
overseas. 
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Digest of Audience Discussion: 
• Generating a focus on the northern border.  It is the dramatic problems at the southern border 
that led to the creation of DHS’s Southwest Border Task force.  The lack of similar problems 
on the northern border makes it difficult to generate political and popular interest.  The issues 
of carbon footprint and of jobs-creation are possible means of attracting the attention of the 
administration.  DHS is involved in the creation of a northern border vision, but the process 
is on the back-burner at this point. 
• Security vs. facilitation.  DHS will always be primarily a defensive organization, with 
“openness” taking a back seat.  Thus, the notion of DHS forming and facilitating advisory 
groups is not workable, as there will be a lack of buy-in from other stakeholders.  Effective 
advisory groups must have facilitation independent of DHS, as is the case with the IMTC. 
• The “rural” border.  The region from the Great Lakes to the Cascades is problematic.  There 
are many small crossings, with low volumes of trade and traffic, and with ageing POEs.  
“Work-alone” prohibitions mean that the POEs must nevertheless be adequately staffed (at 
disproportionate cost relative to the traffic volumes).  This region is suited to initiatives 
aimed at cross-training of CBSA/CBP personnel, and at construction of joint facilities.  There 
is also the need for realistic thought about whether all POEs can be retained. 
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Benefits of Waiving Rule-of-Origin Compliance for Certain HTS Subheadings 
Aaron Hayman and Paul Storer  
 
1. Introduction  This report quantifies the potential benefits of a proposal to waive NAFTA rules 
of origin for goods classified within a certain set of Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) 6-digit 
“subheadings”.   Like all free trade areas, the NAFTA uses rules of origin to specify which goods 
can benefit from the reduced tariffs available under the NAFTA. These rules prevent non-NAFTA 
countries from seeking to enter the NAFTA area by routing exports through the NAFTA country 
with the lowest Normal Trade Relations (NTR) tariff for the product.1 
 
Complying with rules of origin can be costly for exporters who do qualify for the NAFTA 
preferences.  A business exporting goods within NAFTA typically must provide a Certificate of 
Origin to the importer and this certificate will indicate the justification for claiming a NAFTA tariff 
preference rate.  These justifications are based on Annex 401 of the NAFTA and can involve either 
potentially restrictive tariff classification transformations or complex regional-value-content 
calculations.  Moreover, the ever-evolving nature of some business might require a new calculation 
for every shipment. For example, in some businesses the mix of originating and non-originating 
components used to make a product changes continuously over time.  Previous research has 
provided evidence that these compliance costs are sufficiently high that some traders forego the 
benefits they are entitled to under NAFTA. 
 
The costs of complying with NAFTA rules of origin were recognized within the 2005 Security and 
Prosperity Partnership (SPP) process and the SPP has produced some limited reduction of rules of 
origin costs.  More ambitious proposals to completely eliminate NAFTA rules of origin have been 
advanced by proponents of a common external tariff but such a policy is unlikely to be feasible in 
the current political environment.  This paper provides dollar-value estimates of the benefits of an 
intermediate approach to rules of origin liberalization which is more sweeping than the SPP 
approach but which requires no additional harmonization of Normal Trade Relations tariffs. 
 
2. Study Methodology  A promising proposal for  reducing the burden of rules of origin was 
recently proposed by Ballantyne, Hoffman, and Mirus (2004), who described their approach as a 
“streamlining” of NAFTA tariffs.   The full Ballantyne et al proposal identified three cases in which 
Canadian and U.S. third-country tariffs could be streamlined: 
 
(i)  Canada and the U.S. already apply 0 percent tariffs for non-NAFTA countries, 
(ii) Either Canada and/or the U.S. applies a tariff of no more than 5 percent for non-NAFTA 
countries, 
(iii) Situation (ii) does not apply but the Canadian and U.S. NTR tariff rates are within 2 
percentage points of each other. 
 
This paper measures the benefits of applying the first of the three Ballantyne et al proposals to the 
case of U.S. trade with Canada.  When both countries charge a zero tariff to non-NAFTA countries, 
                                                 
1
 We will use term “Normal Trade Relations tariff” to refer to the general tariffs paid by countries that do not benefit 
from the NAFTA tariff preference.  While Canada still uses the term “Most Favored Nation tariff” to describe this 
situation, the United States recently adopted the terms “general tariff” that applies to countries having “normal trade 
relations” with the United States.  
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there is no incentive to enter the United States via a NAFTA partner that charges a lower NTR tariff 
and hence rules of origin can be eliminated without negative consequences.    
 
To measure the potential benefits of the first Ballantyne et al proposal, we obtain data at the 6-digit 
harmonized tariff schedule (HTS) “subheading” level for all NTR tariff rates applied by the United 
States and Canada2. This tariff data is used to identify all cases where rules of origin could be eliminated 
because both Canada and the U.S. already allow the HTS-6 category to enter duty free.  We then use 
trade-volume data from the United States International Trade Commission to measure the volume of 
trade between Canada and the United States in these Canada/U.S. “0/0-tariff” HTS subheadings.  
Existing estimates of the resource costs of rules of origin compliance as a fraction of trade volumes3 are 
then used to determine the transactions-costs reducing benefits of the tariff streamlining.   
 
3. Potential Savings for Total U.S.-Canada Trade  The volume of domestic exports from the 
United States to Canada was $172.7 billion in 20094.  We used 2006 tariff schedules for Canada and 
the U.S. and identified 1,464 6-digit HTS codes with tariffs of zero for all of the tariff lines within 
these subheading codes5.   Mexico is not included in the analysis of this paper because the number 
of HTS-6 codes where all three NAFTA partners have a zero external tariff is relatively small. 
 
The properties of the 1,464 6-digit HTS codes with zero tariffs in both countries are examined in 
Table 1.   These 0/0-tariff HTS codes are grouped into six broad categories based on the industrial  
sector.  For example, we found that electrical equipment accounts for just 5 percent of the Canada-
U.S. 0/0-tariff HTS-6 codes, while commodities other than agricultural and energy commodities 
 
Table 1: Sectoral Description of 0/0-Tariff 6-digit HTS Categories 
Category HTS Chapters % of all lines % 0/0-Tariffs 
Agriculture 1-24 13% 26% 
Energy Products 25-39 20% 27% 
Other Commodities 40-83 38% 27% 
Machinery & Equipment 84 15% 42% 
Electrical Equipment 85 5% 27% 
Other Manufactured Products 86-97 9% 24% 
                                                 
2 We obtain the tariff schedule data from the World Trade Organization. 
3 Compliance cost figures are cited by Ballantyne et al and also available from Kunimoto and Sawchuk (2005). 
4 Domestic exports were less than 2009 “total exports” of $204.7 Billion.  The difference between the two figures 
represents foreign exports that are re-exported via the United States and are in “substantially the same condition as when 
imported”. 
5 Canada and the U.S. frequently use 8-digit and 10-digit categories within a 6-digit category so that each 6-digit 
subheading may contain multiple distinct tariff lines.  As a result, third-country tariffs might be zero for just a portion of 
a 6-digit HTS code. We usually can’t compare 8-digit and 10-digit tariffs because of inconsistent tariff classifications at 
this level of detail.  
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were 38 percent of the 1,464 HTS codes identified as candidates for streamlining.  The fraction of 
the total HTS codes that are free for Canada and the U.S. is constant for most of these industrial 
sectors with the exception of Chapter 84, where the percentage of free HTS-6 codes is much higher 
because of the NAFTA “mini-customs union” in computers and computer parts. 
  
To measure the potential benefits of streamlining rules of origin for trade between the United States 
and Canada we determined the amount of domestic exports from the United States to Canada for 
each of the 1,464 0/0-tariff HTS-6 codes and then summed these commodity-level amounts.   These 
1,464 HTS codes themselves account for almost 25 percent of the total amount of exports from the 
United States to Canada and have a dollar value of $42.5 billion.  This magnitude of these 0/0-tariff 
trade flows suggests that significant benefits could be obtained even if the scope of tariff 
streamlining is limited to just the set of 6-digt tariff categories where both the United States and 
Canada impose zero tariffs on non-NAFTA countries. 
 
To estimate the benefits of tariff streamlining for Alberta, Ballantyne calculated the dollar value of 
exports from Alberta to the United States that were candidates for tariff streamlining and multiplied 
this value by an estimated percentage transactions cost due to rules of origin compliance.  The 
Alberta study used estimates of rule-of-origin transaction costs based on earlier research for free 
trade areas such as the EFTA where these trade-cost percentages ranged in value from 0.25 percent 
to 2 percent of the value of trade flows.   
 
For this study of United States exports to Canada, we applied Ballantyne et al’s 0.25 percent and 2 
percent figures as lower and upper bounds on transactions/compliance costs due to rules of origin. 
This procedure yielded estimated annual savings in 2009 of between $106.1 million and $849.0 
million.  With the 4 percent discount rate used by Ballantyne et al, this constant stream of annual 
savings translates into a total savings of between $2.65 billion and $21.23 billion when measured in 
present-value terms.  It is worth noting that these benefits are derived from 6-digit HTS subheadings 
where neither Canada nor the U.S. applies NTR duties so that no tariff revenue would be lost from 
the proposal to waive these rules of origin.  Additional transactions-costs savings could be obtained 
by implementing the two other components of the Ballantyne et al tariff streamlining proposals. 
  
4. Benefits Related to Individual States’ Exports to Canada In addition to analyzing overall 
benefits of tariff streamlining for U.S. exports to Canada, we also calculated some state-specific 
measures similar to the value that Ballantyne et al provided for Alberta.  The seven states used in our 
analysis are a mix of states in the Pacific region and states with large trading relationships with 
Canada.  The specific states are: Washington, Idaho, Oregon, California, Texas, Michigan, and Ohio.  
To analyze the cost-reducing benefits specific to these states we began with our list of 6-digit HTS 
codes that are free in Canada and the U.S. and looked at exports from the individual states to Canada.   
  
We used origin-of-movement state export data and found the 50 largest HTS codes for each state’s 
exports to Canada.  We then summed the trade flows within these top-50 HTS-6 categories for 
which both Canada and the United States had zero tariffs.  We used the top 50 HTS-6 codes 
because of the difficulty of searching through every possible code for each of the seven states.   The 
fact that the trade total was restricted to the top 50 codes means that our total estimate of trade 
under-estimates the true total trade volume for the state. 
 
The results of this state-level analysis are presented in Table 2.  For each state we present the total 
dollar value for the top-50 HTS codes with NTR tariffs of zero for both countries.  The next 
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Table 2: State-Level Transactions Costs Savings from Tariff Streamlining 
 
 
 
State 
0/0-Tariff 
Top-50 Exports 
% of Total 
Exports 
Cost Savings: 
Lower Bound 
Cost Savings: 
Upper Bound 
Washington $1,529 Million 24.6% $3.8 Million  $30.6 Million  
Idaho $ 167 Million 29.7% $0.4 Million  $3.3 Million  
Oregon $498 Million 18.5% $1.3 Million  $10.0 Million  
California $3,874 Million 27.3% $9.7 Million  $77.5 Million  
Texas $3,349 Million 21.4% $8.4 Million  $67.0 Million  
Michigan $2,229 Million 9.4% $5.6 Million  $44.6 Million  
Ohio $1,272 Million 7.0% $3.2 Million  $25.4 Million 
 
column shows the share of this total as a fraction of the state’s total exports to Canada and the final 
two columns show the upper and lower bounds on the estimates of the transactions costs savings 
using the 0.25 percent and 2 percent figures.  In future work we will expand the number of states 
and will include all HTS-6 subheadings rather than just the 50 largest. Even these partial results 
show significant benefits accruing to states from tariff streamlining. 
   
5.  Suggestions for Increasing the Benefits of Tariff Streamlining The benefits of liberalizing 
rules of origin and streamlining tariffs could be increased if a larger set of tariff categories had a 
value of zero in both countries.  The cost of increasing the number of free/free HTS subheadings is 
the tariff revenue lost in cases where either country has non-zero NTR tariffs.   This lost revenue 
might be minimal because, even when tariffs are not zero, many HTS chapters provide very little 
tariff revenue because of tariff rates close to zero.  Indeed, USITC data show that in 2009 four HTS 
chapters generated no tariff revenue at all. Calculated tariffs were under one million dollars for 13 
additional 13 HTS chapters and over 85 percent of total tariff revenue is generated by just 16 HTS 
chapters.  Chapters generating minimal tariff revenue are certainly candidates for elimination of rules 
of origin. When tariff revenues and Normal Trade Relations tariff rates are so low, there is little or 
no concern about entry of U.S. imports through Canada.  The potential for cost savings could also 
be increased if the NAFTA partners adopted a harmonized tariff classification system through to the 
10-digit level rather than just the current 6-digit level. 
 
6.  Conclusions This study has identified several promising cases where simple changes to 
administrative rules would result in significant savings of transactions costs for the United States and 
for Canada.  These cost savings have the potential to increase the competitiveness of North 
American businesses. Waiving rules of origin requirements for a number of products would also 
allow some border personnel to shift some of their time from rules of origin verification to a focus 
on interdicting undesirable goods or individuals seeking entry to the United States.    
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North American Trade Compliance Costs:  Smallish Progress, Big Constraints 
Greg Anderson 
 
Summary Points/Proposals 
• Harmonize NAFTA Compliance Paperwork 
• Move to Electronic Submission of NAFTA Documentation 
• Further Simplify Rules of Origin 
• Harmonize NAFTA Tariff Schedules (digitize them) 
• Begin work toward harmonizing small differences in MFN tariffs 
• Accumulation 
 
1) Harmonize Rules of Origin Paperwork 
At present, each NAFTA country maintains its own rules of origin paperwork. Each is similar in 
terms of layout and required content, but administered and tracked differently. The Canadian Border 
Services Agency (CBSA), for example, lists 14 separate NAFTA-related forms, including rules of 
origin, only some of which are in fillable PDF format. The US Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) form 434 is fillable and can be saved electronically. CBSA form B232 is fillable, but cannot be 
saved electronically. Rules of origin forms for export to Mexico are available through Aduanas 
Mexico, but not easily accessible online, even for those familiar with Spanish. Interestingly, I 
discovered information on rules of origin requirements for la Asociación Latinoamericana de 
Integración (ALADI), but not the NAFTA. 
 
http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/forms-formulaires/b232-eng.pdf 
http://forms.cbp.gov/pdf/CBP_Form_434.pdf 
 
A single (fillable and savable) trilateral form, recognized by all three countries would simplify rules of 
origin compliance for SMEs as well as large multinationals engaged in significant intra-industry trade 
in which inputs and products cross borders several times before final assembly (particularly true in 
auto sector).  
 
Lastly, a single “NAFTA Compliance” box on existing cargo manifests used in North America 
would greatly streamline such procedures. Such a simplification would compliment existing cargo 
shipping procedures as they have evolved in North America over the past couple of years. 
 
2) Electronic Submission 
An obvious extension of harmonizing rules of origin paperwork would be to make it possible to 
submit paperwork electronically. Moreover, moving more fully toward online compliance would 
streamline rules of origin procedures even further. All three countries have moved heavily toward e-
filing in areas of tax collection and compliance as a money saving measure. However, such 
procedures have also enhanced the oversight process by allowing the least problematic tax filers to 
do so simply and easily.  
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Electronic submission of NAFTA compliance paperwork should be relatively easy to integrate into 
some existing programs established by US legislation in the past several years governing the 
movement people and goods for which advance electronic submission is now a requirement.  
Particularly noteworthy are the advance reporting provisions of both the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 and 
the U.S. Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-210 
and 107-188 respectively). Under both laws, shippers of goods to the United States are now subject to 
a range of advance reporting requirements depending on the mode of transportation being used to 
ship them. Specifically, as of January 2005, shipping of any kind to the United States required that 
electronic manifests be shared with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Service and with advance 
times of as much as 24 hours in the case of ocean-going vessels, 4 hours if shipments are made via air, 
2 hours by rail, down to as little as 30 minutes for trucks participating in the FAST program.1 
 
However, the Bioterrorism Act of 2002 goes even further in mandating that foreign shippers have a 
designated agent or representative in the United States, register with the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and provide advance notification of food shipments of 2 hours by road, 4 by 
rail or air, and 8 if arriving via water.2 Moreover, there are now several frequent shipper and trusted 
traveler programs such as CT-PAT, FAST, and CSI, NEXUS, SENTRI, the US-VISIT program, or 
the new Secure Flight program that have necessitated cross-border cooperation (some might say 
unilaterally so) and information sharing among private and public sector stakeholders in all three 
countries. Integrating NAFTA compliance paperwork/procedures into existing changes to supply-
chain management by private firms that U.S. legislation has already necessitated should be relatively 
straightforward. Moreover, it is an initiative that private sector interests could easily embrace since it 
would streamline currently disparate procedures. 
 
Lastly, doing so would go some distance toward pushing more of the processing of persons and 
cargo away from border crossings, relieving some of the pressure on inspections procedures at the 
busiest of them. Moreover, initiating work on how to integrate electronic submission of NAFTA 
paperwork along with other reporting requirements in place for security purposes may also re-
stimulate thinking about larger projects such as customs pre-clearance for cargo.3 
 
3) Further Rules of Origin Work 
 
Rules of origin arbitrate the discriminatory impact and trade-creating potential of FTAs. On the one 
hand, rules of origin are a necessary evil within FTAs since they prevent the transshipment of non-
member goods through the member state with the lowest external tariffs, thereby undermining the 
benefits membership in the FTA. At the same time, rules of origin have increasingly been vilified as 
inefficient, possibly protectionist, measures at odds with the objectives of trade liberalization. This 
has been especially true within the NAFTA area where the original rules of origin, as designed, were 
                                                 
1 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Service, “Frequently Asked Questions,” Trade Act of 2002 Final Rule, August 3, 
2004; see also Trade Act of 2002, Title III, Section 343, Mandatory Advanced Electronic Information for Cargo and 
Other Improved Customs Reporting Procedures. 
2 (See PL 107-188, Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Section 307; and 
FDA, Guidance for Industry, Prior Notice of Imported Food, Questions and Answers, May 2004 at 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~pn/pnqagui2.html#require). 
3 See Government Accountability Office, “Various Issues Led to the Termination of the United States-Canada Shared 
Border Management Pilot Project,” GAO-08-1038R, September 4, 2008. 
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among the most complex and highly restrictive in the Western Hemisphere.4 However, in the past 
several years, NAFTA countries have been engaged in successive revisions (4) of rules of origin to 
simplify the process in areas such as alcoholic beverages, petroleum, some auto parts, copiers, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, footwear, and copper, among others. 
  
The major advantage with continuing this work is that it falls under the NAFTA’s built-in agenda 
and requires no new legislation in any of the three countries for new changes. Moreover, progress 
on rules of origin in the NAFTA will deepen the integration among NAFTA Parties while also 
reducing levels of discrimination faced by non-members, possibly laying the foundation for broader 
liberalization efforts in the future. An important challenge confronting rules of origin work will be 
the differing tariff structures maintained by NAFTA partners vis-à-vis non-NAFTA countries; a 
consequence of the relatively shallow stage of integration represented by FTAs and the reason for 
rules of origin in the first place. 
 
4) Harmonize Tariff Schedule (digitize it, too) 
The idea of the NAFTA members harmonizing their tariffs with the rest of the world has arisen on 
several occasions, but big differences in the size of each country’s tariff schedule prevents much 
progress. Harmonization would require US legislation to make changes, but might be possible, 
particularly where tariff lines and rates were especially close together. While all three countries follow 
the Harmonized System, which harmonizes tariff lines at the six-digit level, the quantity of more 
detailed break-outs at the eight-digit level varies.  Canada has 6,821 industrial tariff lines; the United 
States has 8,445; and Mexico has 10,326.  
 
This is part of the explanation for why there is no single tariff schedule for NAFTA countries; each 
maintains their own. Short of harmonization of tariff schedules into a single “NAFTA Document,” a 
searchable electronic data base of tariff schedules of all three countries in a single location, perhaps 
managed by the NAFTA Secretariate, would greatly simplify NAFTA compliance paperwork processes. 
This would not require legislation, but might entail some expenditure of funds to establish and operate. 
 
There has been some work in this direction. Under NAFTA Article 311, the three countries did 
harmonize tariff rates for computers/computer parts, local area network equipment and 
semiconductors (and therefore NAFTA rules of origin are no longer relevant). However, because so 
many US and Canadian tariff rates are already at zero, and WTO obligations would prevent 
harmonization upward toward Mexican levels, new obligations would necessarily come from Mexico 
and involve numerous complications with Mexico’s non-NAFTA FTA partners.  
 
Moreover, NAFTA rules of origin could not be dispensed with if, say, only the U.S. and Canada 
harmonized for certain products.  Nonetheless, such a bilateral “limited customs union” tariff 
arrangement would require some maneuvering around and through NAFTA, but it might be 
achievable--whereby the two countries would simply deem certain products as “originating” for 
purposes of a tariff preference when shipped across our mutual border, regardless of their actual 
origin (because the tariffs--to the extent that there were still some applicable--would presumably 
                                                 
4
 Antoni Estevadeordal, Matthew Shearer, Kati Suominen, “Multilateralizing RTAs in the Americas: State of Play and 
Ways Forward” Paper presented at the Conference on Multilateralising Regionalism Sponsored and Organized by WTO 
– HEI Co-organized by the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 10-12 September 2007, Geneva, Switzerland. 
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already have been collected at each country’s border).  But it wouldn’t do anything for trade flows 
on the southern border unless Mexico decided to participate. 
 
In addition to the legislative hurdle, the most significant issue in making progress here may be that 
the United States will want some significant “payoff” in return for the political effort. In practical 
terms, this means such tariff harmonization might only be possible in the context of the WTO 
where the gains for the United States would be greatest. 
 
4) Begin Harmonizing MFN Tariffs in NAFTA Area 
 
This is admittedly a larger political project, mainly because of the uncertainty of winning Mexico’s 
acquiescence; Mexico maintains a significantly higher tariff structure toward non-NAFTA partners 
giving it some bargaining power with other potential FTA partners. Moreover, reducing remaining 
US tariff rates would also require legislation. 
 
However, there are roughly 24 HTS lines in which NAFTA country MFN rates are zero and another 
400 where MFN rates are within a few percentage points. For Canada and the United States, there is 
far more commonality in MFN rates; more than 3000 are at zero. This large number of common 
MFN tariffs between Canada and the United States is largely the result of sectoral commitments the 
two countries undertook during Uruguay Round negotiations, including participation in the 
Agreement on trade in Civil Aircraft  (other sectors included Ag equipment, medical equipment, 
construction equipment, paper, steel, chemicals, etc).  Mexico was not a participant in these sector 
discussions and maintains MFN rates on many items 25-30 percentage points higher. 
 
It is questionable whether Mexico can be convinced to sign on to the initiatives cited above, since all 
such changes would need to be submitted to the Mexican Senate for approval. Reducing its MFN 
tariff rates by such a degree would eliminate its bargaining power in multilateral negotiations and 
dilute the value of future FTAs. 
 
5) Accumulation 
Conceptually, accumulation would allow the gradual knitting together of overlapping FTAs (the 
spaghetti bowl) such as those that have been concluded by NAFTA countries with third parties. In 
short, inputs from one FTA (such as the US-Chile FTA) could be deemed as originating under the 
NAFTA’s rules of origin and qualify for duty free treatment in Canada and Mexico as well. Progress 
on this could probably only be made on a sector-by-sector basis and would, in the United States, 
require legislation to change the terms of existing US FTA obligations. It is possible that such an 
effort could be challenged under WTO rules as violating MFN principles, but might also be 
permissible under the vague language of Article XXIV of the GATT that permits FTAs and other 
preferences schemes provided they “substantially liberalize all trade.” In addition, various US 
preferences schemes, such as the Generalized System of Preferences, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 
or the African Growth and Opportunity Act, have used WTO waivers requests to permit 
preferences schemes as long as they were generalized. Since many of the FTA’s concluded by 
NAFTA countries with third parties are with developing countries, it may be possible to proceed 
initially in a fashion similar to that pursued under the GSP, CBI, or AGOA. Pursuit of accumulation 
would be inherently discriminatory within the multilateral system, but would be generally liberalizing 
at the same time. 
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Background 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were a period of rapid change in North American economic 
relations. Two major trade agreements, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1989 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, seemed to herald a new period 
of economic and political integration in a direction similar to that which had evolved in Europe 
during the postwar period. However, shortly after the NAFTA was concluded, three major 
constraints effectively ended progress on issues left over from the NAFTA debate and stifled those 
designed to build upon what had begun; first, the absence of new money for new initiatives, 
secondly, the need to avoid generating new disputes, and third, and most importantly, the imperative 
that new initiatives not require new legislation. In other words, think small. 
These three constraints, which I will refer to as the “three noes,” as defining characteristics of post-
NAFTA North America are, in part, a pragmatic response to the poisonous politics of trade 
liberalization that emerged out of the NAFTA debate in 1994; the NAFTA ratification fight in the 
US had been exhausting and no new political project to deepen integration was possible. Hence, the 
North American agenda has both suffered under the three constraints and been advanced within 
them. While the North American trade liberalization agenda stalled through the balance of the 
1990s, North America has, since 9/11 been the subject of significant policy attention, all of it, 
unfortunately, restricted by the “three noes.” 
Since the conclusion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, policy-
makers, academics, and policy wonks of all stripes have been engaged in the search for “next steps” 
in North American governance. That search is littered with the policy recommendation wreckage of 
numerous blue ribbon panels, “eminent person’s groups,” and government reports, the majority of 
which have recommended picking up where the NAFTA left off and moving towards deeper stages 
of economic integration and political coordination in North America. Throughout the 1990s, 
initiatives were launched, shelved, and sometimes launched again, in an effort to deal with the 
NAFTA’s perceived shortcomings, nearly all of which came to naught, in part because of the 
restrictions of the three major constraints noted above. 
Not until the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States did any of this activity 
generate movement toward more coordinated North American governance, nearly all of which was 
devoted to mitigating the negative trade effects of enhanced security. In the process, economic 
policy was wedded to security in North America, but remained subject to, and ultimately limited by 
the “three noes” The 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) was designed to manage the 
new nexus but was, in effect, an imperfect byproduct of the many previously unsuccessful initiatives 
to deal with the lingering imperfections of the NAFTA.  
One of the main challenges confronting North America in the management of borders actually 
concerns the SPP and its US implementation by the Department of Homeland Security (Security 
Agenda) and the Department of Commerce (Prosperity Agenda).  Since the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security in 2003, management of policies concerning America’s two 
borders has converged around security and law enforcement. Ineffectual mechanisms for border 
management, such as the SPP, have actually served to burry large parts of the North American 
agenda within each country’s bureaucracies, making them more difficult to deal with.  
In addition, the NAFTA is now nearly 20 years old (2014) with the longest phase-ins having come 
into effect in January 2008. The NAFTA’s built-in agenda, comprised of some 20 working groups 
created by the Agreement, was never seriously built upon, nor has it been advanced by the SPP. 
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Hence, as a result of the “mature” status of the trilateral trading relationship and the imperatives of 
security, it has been security that has largely driven the entire North American agenda.  
For a short period, all of this stimulated new rounds of initiatives and policy proposals designed to 
garner the attention of new leadership in Washington, Ottawa, and Mexico City. Proposals and 
approaches have ranged from sweeping new integration projects, such as a customs union or the 
creation of a binding joint commission to manage border issues, to the devolution of responsibility 
for border management to local and regional interests such as states and provinces or public-private 
partnerships. 
However, to the “three noes,” one might add a fourth; no vision by the political leadership about 
what North America could be. Worse, that lack of vision is itself constrained by the “three noes,” 
further limiting the policy space in which to remedy the negative economic spillovers from enhanced 
security. In sum, according to some analysts, the combination of paralysis over the NAFTA’s 
unfinished business coupled with the plethora of new security measures imposed at North America’s 
borders have served to completely reverse all of the gains from trade liberalization won in 1994 after 
the NAFTA’s implementation.5 
In short, the paradigm regarding the border has been settled. No major new integration projects are 
on the horizon. The SPP, useful as an agenda setting exercise, was only that. No legislation, no 
money, no disputes, and no vision to overcome the other three means that any and all changes to 
border management, particularly as they related to economic policy, must be made administratively; 
that is, they cannot entail new expenditures or require new legislative action. 
Think Small, …For Now 
Legislative Hurdles 
As of January 2008, the final phase-ins of the NAFTA were implemented. Trilateral work continues, 
but only so much can be achieved within the confines of the NAFTA’s built-in agenda and, more 
importantly, within the limitations imposed by the need to go back to national legislatures to move 
beyond it. This would necessitate the launch of a significant political project in North America that 
the “Background” section below argues is impractical. 
Moreover, each NAFTA country has its own legislative hurdles to overcome depending on the 
ambition of the work undertaken. In the United States, for example, tariffs can usually be changed 
only through legislation, while the rules of origin in FTAs can be modified through administrative 
procedures.  In Mexico, tariffs can be modified through administrative means.  Non-substantive 
changes to the NAFTA rules of origin can be implemented administratively, while the Mexican 
Senate must approve substantive changes. 
The U.S. legislation used to implement the various free trade agreements are similarly constructed.  
Each grants the President the authority to accelerate the elimination of tariffs and modify the non-
textile rules of origin following a consultation process (federal register).  The NAFTA partners have 
completed four rounds of tariff acceleration and three sets of changes to the rules of origin using 
these procedures.   
                                                 
5 Robert Pastor, “Should Canada, Mexico, and the United States Replace Two Dysfunctional Bilateral Relationships 
With a North American Community?” 14th Annual Distinguished Lecture Department of Political Science University of 
Alberta Edmonton, Alberta March 15, 2010. 
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Apart from legislation modifying aspects of the NADBank Charter (PL108-215), the United States 
has never passed legislation modifying its NAFTA commitments. 6 The NAFTA implementing 
legislation is actually silent on whether other types of changes to the Agreement would require 
legislation, but the practical assumption has been that most changes outside what the NAFTA 
contemplates inside the built-in agenda would require legislation in the US.  
Hence, absent a new political project leading to legislative changes, any initiatives must be conducted 
within the confines of existing legislative authority.  
Cost of Compliance 
No systematic study on the costs of complying with NAFTA rules of origin to obtain duty -free 
tariff treatment has been done. However, some work has been done on possibly harmonizing MFN 
tariff rates applied by each NAFTA country to all non-NAFTA members as a means of eliminating 
rules of origin requirements within the NAFTA area. For instance, there are a large number of MFN 
tariffs that vary by 5% or less among the three countries. This would serve to eliminate the need for 
rules of origin paperwork on all of those tariff lines since all three countries would be levying the 
same MFN rates on non-NAFTA inputs. This would simplify rules of origin compliance costs, 
particularly for small businesses without the economies of scale necessary to make NAFTA 
compliance worthwhile.  
The benefits of such changes would be broadly felt, but possibly stimulate export activity by small 
and medium sized enterprises (SME) or 100 employees or less. According to Industry Canada 
(2006), approximately 95% of Canada’s businesses are classified as small and yet only 1.4 percent of 
these businesses engage in exporting products. Moreover, a 2008 survey of SMEs in Western 
Canada revealed that obtaining adequate customs information as well as “problems” with US 
Customs authorities were significant barriers to Canadian exporters.  
While MFN tariff rates differ among NAFTA countries, they are low enough, and paperwork and 
compliance costs within the NAFTA significant enough, that SMEs are in some cases merely 
incurring the extra MNF rate costs instead of the significant drain on time and resources to qualify 
for duty free treatment under the NAFTA.
                                                 
6 In March 2004, the Congress approved HR 254 (later PL 108-215), which allowed the administration to agree to a 
change to the charter of the NADBank, which allowed the bank to extend its zone of operations from 100 to 300 
kilometers into Mexico.  
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Digest of Audience Discussion: 
• Applicability of the term “waive”.  While it is possible to use administrative changes to 
liberalize rules of origin, in practice the rules can’t be waived  because the term “waive” 
suggests that the Executive Branch could have the discretion to direct CBP (or another 
agency) to apply or not apply the rules of origin for certain groups of goods.  An exception to 
this general rule is found in Annex 308.1 of the NAFTA which does effectively waive 
application of the rules of origin for a wide range of items.  While the Annex 308.1 approach 
might provide a possible example for how to waive the rules for other goods, it doesn’t seem 
to be possible to “shoehorn” a comprehensive set of commodities into Annex 308.1 through 
administrative changes because Annex 308.1 only applies to data processing equipment.  The 
possibility of finding other creative methods to broaden the Annex 308.1 approach was 
mentioned. 
• Benefits associated with zero-tariff situation.  For finished goods traded between NAFTA 
partners, there wouldn’t be much saving in terms of compliance costs for items with a zero 
NTR/MFN tariff because someone importing such a good would have no incentive to claim 
the NAFTA tariff.  For an intermediate input to an item that will cross the border again in the 
future, however, there might still be an incentive to complete the rules of origin paperwork in 
order to establish the North American origin of the higher-level good made from the 
intermediate input.  The low (or zero) cost of rules of origin compliance for final goods with 
zero MFN/NTR tariffs means that the lower-end of the range of compliance cost estimates is 
probably the most applicable for these commodity codes.  It would also be worthwhile to go 
back and look at goods with MFN/NTR tariffs of up to 2 percent.  The necessity of including 
Mexico in changes to rules of origin was discussed. 
• Benefits to small businesses.  A University of Alberta study showed significant NAFTA rules 
of origin compliance costs for small businesses.  This was consistent with anecdotal evidence 
of challenges facing fragrance manufacturers forced to deal with constantly-changing mixes 
of originating and non-originating chemicals in vats.  These problems for small businesses 
contrast with a fairly successful NAFTA process in which businesses can petition for 
liberalization of rules of origin for products not produced in North America but used as part 
of the production process.  An example of the petitioning process was diluants used to ensure 
smooth flow of oil-sands related products in pipelines.  USTR could benefit from information 
about liberalization that would benefit small businesses, in part because small businesses are 
less likely to submit a petition. 
• Inconsistent HTS codes.  There seemed to be no quick administrative solution to inconsistent 
HTS codes at the 8 and 10-digit levels.  Costs of divergent regulatory regimes might now be 
more of a problem than tariffs given the success of past tariff reduction rounds.  Regulations 
of chemicals and pesticides was mentioned. 
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Discussant Remarks: 
 
Geoffrey Hale, re: panels 1 and 2 
Locating Micro-Policy Initiatives within Macro and Regional Governance Frameworks  
 
A common theme of papers presented in this seminar is the challenge of integrating the effective 
management of flows in a variety of distinctive border crossing and “near-border” environments 
within the Department of Homeland Security’s broader mandate to secure borders, supply chains 
and broader systems. These systems structure flows of hundreds of millions of people, millions of 
trucks, and hundreds of billions of dollars worth of goods across America’s borders every year. 
This challenge has been formally recognized in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review of 
February 2010, as noted by Kathryn Friedman and David Davidson. Gatherings such as this one 
provide opportunities to translate these commitments into practical ideas and then effective action 
by engaging and mobilizing the cooperation of stakeholders, initially in state and local governments 
and academia – and ultimately of other non-governmental organizations and the private sector. They 
demonstrate the vital linkage between effective policy and operational research and effective 
governance structures.  
The papers presented in the first panel illustrate three different dimensions of the environment for 
effective border management. Hugh Conroy’s analysis of transition times for trucks and cars at the 
Blaine, WA border crossing – by far the busiest crossing between the Great Lakes and the Pacific 
Coast – focuses on two discrete operational dynamics of border crossings affecting both DHS front-
line staff and border crossing staff.  
Conroy’s “micro”-analysis provides two useful findings that complement published observations by 
front-line officers. First, there are significant variations in transition times in truck processing lanes 
that occur at fairly regular intervals – suggesting the possibility of staffing changes or other 
scheduled interruptions in the processing of travelers. (One union official advised a Congressional 
hearing in June 2008 that shift changes often resulted in a break of up to five minutes when officers 
rebooted their computers.) Secondly, there are significant variations in the processing times for truck 
transports of various kinds – most of which are subject to advance notice requirements for 
shipments they may be carrying – and for light cars and pickup trucks. Many drivers in the latter 
group have been characterized by Christopher Sands as “amateur” travelers: people crossing the 
border whose “risk” of criminal behaviour is undetermined and who may be less familiar with 
border procedures, thereby contributing to slower processing times.  
These findings highlight the value of David Davidson’s proposal for the formation of regional 
Centers of Excellence that can serve as venues for commissioning and circulating research on 
effective border operations, and of Chris Sands’ call for DHS / CBP to cultivate a culture of 
Continuous Process Improvement in both local/regional and national contexts. As noted by Sands, 
providing front-line staff with both encouragement and incentives to suggest process improvements 
that meet broader organizational objectives is an important part of the process of quality 
management in all public service organizations. 
Conroy’s findings complement William Anderson’s argument that “the proportion of FAST-
qualified shipments may be inefficiently low from a system-wide perspective”. Professor Anderson 
notes several measures that have been taken to address the problem of the “common queue” for 
FAST and non-FAST registered shippers and trucking firms. His analysis overlaps with that of Anne 
Goodchild and Matthew Klein – noting the importance of the near-border environment, including 
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firm sizes, product mixes and the presence of non-border related bottlenecks that may reduce the 
marginal benefits provided by investing in FAST membership. 
If Anderson’s findings are based on his research on crossings in the Detroit-Port Huron corridor 
and the Niagara frontier, with their disproportionate number of shippers dependent on the 
automotive industry and other “just-in-time” applications, they apply even more strongly to 
crossings in the Cascade corridor – where Goodchild and Klein’s study (and other research) notes 
that less than 10 percent of trucks use FAST rather than ‘general purpose’ lanes at the border. 
Differences between the Cascade corridor on one hand, and the New York and Michigan frontiers 
on the other are reinforced by the much lower prevalence of ‘just-in-time’ supply chains on the 
Pacific Coast, and the presence of major transportation bottlenecks at the Ports of Seattle-Tacoma 
and Vancouver (BC).  
Anderson’s suggestion that FAST-enabled traffic be funneled along specific corridors – based on the 
NEXUS-only restriction that has been implemented at Niagara Falls’ Whirlpool Bridge – could be a 
viable option for addressing the problem of the common queue described in his paper, especially in 
areas of high population concentration in which bridge crossings create natural border bottlenecks. 
It could also provide a positive incentive, if at the margins, for encouraging more shippers to qualify 
for the FAST program. However, given the large number of small trucking firms whose business 
models do not make FAST a viable alternative, the suggestion of subsidizing their costs of coming 
into compliance is likely to face significant challenges based on equity unless combined with a series 
of complementary measures to address border facilitation. 
This message is clearly conveyed by Goodchild and Klein’s analysis of cross-border traffic flows and 
their interaction with market and regulatory incentives for the trucking industry. Some of these 
questions – such as the issues of vehicle weight limits and truck configurations – could be addressed 
through cross-border cooperation by neighboring jurisdictions, although allowing longer, heavier 
trucks and truck-trailer combinations on roads usually invites public controversy, especially in 
congested metropolitan areas. More vexing is the challenge of cabotage regulations, which must 
overcome deeply entrenched lobbies in both countries, and which is highlighted by their finding that 
more than 40 percent of southbound trucks at Blaine cross the border empty.  
Professor Goodchild’s research regularly highlights features of regional transportation markets 
which the relevance of regional particularities to understanding the border. In this case, it is the 
major disparity in the distribution of distances travelled by northbound and southbound truckers 
before crossing the border. However, her suggestion that empty trucks be banned from FAST lanes 
appears to work at cross-purposes with concerns related to the problem of the ‘common queue’. If 
regulatory factors, over which individual trucking firms have little or no control, and industry-
specific differences between cross-border shipping patterns, are the primary causes of the high 
proportion of “empties”, a border-related tax large enough to “correct” the problem is likely to 
create other market distortions and unintended consequences which will need to be corrected by 
other policy measures. Thus, any changes in border-specific regulations should be integrated with a 
broader package of regulatory measures which address the (dis)incentive effects of regulatory 
measures in promoting greater productivity, environmental sustainability, and other relevant policy 
goals. 
Taken together, these papers highlight the importance of understanding the U.S.-Canada border as 
clusters of different systems, which share some commonalities, especially with respect to security 
rules and internal operational considerations of DHS and CBP, but also significant differences in the 
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physical and broader market environments which structure patterns and incentives for cross-border 
flows of people and goods.  
The interaction of these systems raises significant questions of governance: whether internal, as 
suggested by Christopher Sands’ paper on Total Quality Management and Continuous Process 
Improvement, regional – as suggested by David Davidson’s proposals for creating regional 
stakeholder forums, or national – as with Kathryn Friedman’s proposal for a Northern Border 
Advisory Task Force.  
They also point to the reality that there are no magic bullets in enhancing security or the facilitation of 
low-risk trade and travel on the border. Rather, we are assembling tool-kits that allow the adaptation 
of common principles of effective risk management and more cost-effective facilitation to widely 
varying operational environments. We owe no less to the men and women on the front lines, or to the 
millions of law-abiding citizens whose cooperation is necessary to make the border work for all of us. 
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Jason Ackleson, re: panel 2 
 
Each of these papers addresses a key but relatively underemphasized mission of the Department of 
Homeland Security: trade facilitation.  Until recently, DHS’s overriding focus at U.S. borders was 
rooted in a national security paradigm that, many critics have argued, placed trade in a secondary 
position.  There are signs this is changing under DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano and Customs and 
Border Protection Commissioner Alan Bersin.  Perhaps the best articulation of this change is found 
in language in the recently released Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) which emphasizes 
the compatibility of both trade and security.  If this is a new trend, the papers are well-timed in their 
offering of policy-relevant solutions to advance reform. 
Kathryn Friedman’s paper takes a governance-oriented approach to address the security/trade 
tension at the U.S.-Canada border.  This framework is emerging as a promising approach to both 
studying and implementing border security policy.  Scholars increasingly suggest that border 
governance, often in play at multiple levels (such as state, regional, national, and international) and 
among multiple actors (law enforcement, private sector stakeholders, and others), is a more useful 
method of achieving security and trade goals.  In its new focus on resilience, layered security, and 
collaboration, I detect recognition of this idea within DHS, both within and without the QHSR. On 
the ground, governance has been advanced in issue areas such as emergency response where 
planning and coordination between federal and state/local officials is much improved.   
More, however, can and should be done.  Governance measures that can be developed in a cross-
border (US/Canada) fashion, in my view, are particularly important.  This, I believe, is the only really 
substantive way forward to improving the way the northern border works; surely to address both 
trade facilitation and security, organizational change needs not only be focused inward, but outward – 
engaging our Canadian partners in more substantive ways on solutions such as shared border 
management.  While all three papers focus largely on border governance within the US, their scope 
could be expanded to address practical cross-border governance measures that can be undertaken.  
Those of us who live on U.S. borders and study them have long argued for a more coordinated, 
long-term vision for border policy.  Friedman’s call for this is thus appreciated.  And, there are some 
good initiatives to do this underway—the Border Governors Conference, for instance, has recently 
issued comprehensive guidelines for the competitive and sustainable development of the U.S.-
Mexico trans-border region. The non-binding guidelines identify concrete policy goals, such as 
logistical efficiency and coordinated infrastructure planning.   Similar work for the US-Canada 
frontier would be welcome. 
Friedman asserts that “to date, private sector voices do not have a seat at the table when it comes to 
northern border policymaking.”  However, DHS has an Office of International Trade (within CBP) 
which seeks to integrate and balance the goals of trade facilitation and trade compliance. And actors 
such as the Canadian – American Border Trade Alliance have been actively involved in advancing 
commercial interests in border policy. While these and other organizations may not be as effective as 
they could be, they are at least part of the discussion.   
Friedman’s main suggestion—establishing a Northern Border Advisory Task Force—is a solid idea; 
I would only suggest the need for a wider, politically-backed effort to support such work, and this 
can be partly advanced by strengthening outside institutions and equipping them to advocate for 
better governance measures. On southern border issues, the Congressional border caucus, led by 
Solomon Ortiz and others, for instance, has been influential in a number of policy areas. The 
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northern border caucus or groups like the border legislative conference could be similarly 
strengthened in order to build political support for task force ideas. 
David Davidson offers some very interesting commentary on DHS’s Centers of Excellence (COE) 
program.   This initiative, run from DHS’ Science and Technology Directorate, seeks to develop 
science and technology solutions to homeland security problems through research-oriented 
university partnerships.   Davidson is correct in his assertion that trade facilitation receives only 
cursory treatment in the existing COE program.  Having worked with several COEs for a number 
of years, I would make a larger and more general point that they tend to over-prioritize technology 
over policy work in their research portfolios.  This fact may explain part of why trade is neglected. 
Rather than a new Center—difficult at a time when this portion of DHS’s budget is being cut—I 
would suggest integrating and refocusing existing COE priorities in this direction.  While doing so, 
we need to make COEs work better, in terms of access to data, collaborations, and in integration 
with the wider DHS enterprise. 
A refocused COE program could easily assist DHS, for instance, on the issue of trade facilitation.  
Addressing lengthy wait times at ports of entry is a longstanding problem that could be partly 
addressed through better data collection and analysis.  CBP’s current methods to estimate wait 
times—methods such as polling travelers—do not accurately track this problem.  In addition, CBP 
does not currently calculate the economic impact of entry delays at POEs on trade or commerce nor 
can it adequately analyze how new developments and infrastructure improvements in Mexico or 
Canada will impact future traffic flows at U.S. POEs.  This kind of analysis, which could be done with 
university partners in a COE, would be extremely helpful in enabling CBP to take steps to improve 
port infrastructure and allocate sufficient staff and resources in a proactive rather than reactive manner.   
Finally, Chris Sands’ call for DHS to implement Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) and Total 
Quality Management (TQM) is a welcome way to address organizational behavior at DHS. I do 
caution about the strict applicability of the CPI and TQM models to an enterprise like DHS which 
operates in a political environment unlike those contexts in the business world where these models 
have taken root.  However, I agree with Sands that decentralizing decision-making and operations is 
probably one of most feasible ways this could be done.  Other reforms, such as enabling front line 
officers to offer feedback to upper management on their immediate supervisors, also offer possible 
ways to improve performance.  For these sorts of changes to happen, however, DHS needs to be 
flexible and willing to learn.  This task is made simultaneously easier because the agency does not have 
a long history to undo but also harder in simply the scope of the agency: it has over 225,000 employ-
ees and deals with a range of tasks as diverse as oil spill cleanups and screening agricultural imports. 
How can DHS change?  Research on organizational learning suggests there are three main ways 
organizations behave and thus three main ways they can learn and change.  First, since behavior is 
mainly based on routine, organizations match procedures to situations rather than calculate choices.  
Therefore, to learn, the routine of how DHS operates on the border needs to change. Second, 
organization actions are often history-dependent.  Organizations tend to act based mostly on the 
past rather than the future.  Therefore, to learn, organizations need to put aside history to do things 
differently.  DHS’s relatively short history makes this easier.  Finally, organizations are oriented to 
targets.  Behavior depends on aspirations for successful outcomes, e.g., meeting a target.  To learn 
and change, the right targets must be set and resources dedicated to meeting them.  Current 
leadership at agency suggests at least an openness to setting such targets and thus adjusting the 
orientation of its work.  If this proves to be the case, the concrete policy steps outlined in these 
papers may find their policy audience. 
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Don Alper, re: panel 2 
 
These three papers make suggestions on how to improve border governance.  Each contains 
workable ideas for expediting the flows of commercial goods and services across the border. 
Governance at different levels is discussed.  Katie Friedman points out how at the macro level DHS 
lacks an effective way to negotiate the interplay between security and economic interests.  She 
proposes a border task force within DHS to focus on economic interests.  Such a task force would 
presumably act to insert greater economic considerations into the design and formulation of policy that is 
predominantly influenced by security concerns—the heart of DHS’s mandate.  
At the micro level, Chris Sands looks to Total Quality Management and CPI as organizational tools 
that could be used to increase efficiency and quality at the port level.  By relying more on advice 
from line-workers and supervisors, port-level governance would be more pragmatic (in terms of 
adopting new methods proven to be workable), more adaptable to changing needs in both the 
security and commercial arenas, and more responsive to variable conditions extant in different 
regional settings.   
David Davidson highlights a successful port-specific stakeholder forum, the International Mobility 
and Trade Corridor Project (IMTC), as a model of what should be created in the busiest crossings.  
He discusses a number of factors that contribute to IMTC success.  The IMTC forum has been 
successful in facilitating projects which have improved mobility through the Cascade Gateway ports.  
Katie’s proposed new northern border advisory task force is in concept an extension of other DHS 
advisory panels.  But there is an important difference.  All the others are keyed to security issues and 
problems. DHS’s mandate is to keep people safe.  Keeping people safe has little or nothing to do 
with expediting commerce or improving the cross border trade environment.  The mandate of DHS, 
as mentioned in the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, does touch on commerce 
to the extent that DHS is to take care to “reduce unnecessary encumbrances to lawful travel and 
trade” and “prevent the exploitation of the interconnected trading system…” In this regard, DHS is 
mandated to consider the effects of the agency’s actions on commerce.  Although important, 
considering the effects of commerce is quite different than having a voice in formulating border 
policy.  The central question is how do you insert commercial values in a governance system where 
rewards and incentives pertain to success in keeping bad things out, not letting good things in?  
Both Chris and David propose strengthening governance at the port-level through greater 
involvement of stakeholders.  The solutions they recommend are quite different. Chris would 
strengthen port-level organization capacity by having CBP adopt TQM and CPI.  Although 
adoption of these managerial practices could result in greater efficiencies in inspections and 
processing, it is not clear how these practices would be informed by  commercial stakeholders.  
Specifically, how would local stakeholders such as local shippers, local chambers of commerce and 
business representatives such as tourism promoters, local political figures represent constituent 
concerns to CBP?  What kind of outreach is needed to do this?  Currently, there is very little 
outreach undertaken by enforcement officials to stakeholders.* 
David’s solution—clone the IMTC forum at key ports—would boost regional capacity at these 
crossings.  As he notes, such forums need focused problems to get traction. The IMTC forum got 
traction because of a long term stream of funding, competent leadership and most importantly its 
laser beam focus on cross border transporation planning which attracted interest from a binational 
policy community.  Although not mentioned in David’s discussion, I suspect another factor in 
IMTC success is that benefits of actions go to many jurisdictions and interests on both sides of the 
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border.  Its work results in non-zero sum outcomes and its benefits can appeal to both economic 
and environmental sectors. 
While successful, the IMTC model has limitations.  Its transportation focus may be too narrow for 
many stakeholders concerned about trade facilitation.  Specifically, professional service providers—
accountants, planners, consultants, etc—are likely to be more interested in the rules of crossing than 
the border operations or infrastructure that facilitate commerce.  Another problem is size and 
efficacy.  How large and diverse can a forum be before it loses its efficacy?  A third issue pertains to 
both port-specific local stakeholder committees (Sands) and IMTC-type forums:  How can a local, 
port-specific organization most effectively engage in “bottom-up” diplomacy to influence (or, in 
Sands’ words, to transmit best practices across the organization) the policy making process at the 
national level?  
Finally, a federally funded COE focused on trade facilitation would support and augment efforts at 
both the micro and macro levels.  Situating the COE in vital cross border regions would further 
elevate regional innovation in the overall governance equation. 
 
 
 
*reported in D. Alper and B. Hammond, Stakeholder Views on Improving Border Management, Research Report Number 8, 
Border Policy Research Institute, December 2009. 
